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THE IMPENDING STORM:
THE SUPREME COURT'S FORAY INTO
THE SECOND AMENDMENT DEBATE
Christopher Keleher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Parker v. District of Columbia made history as the first in-
stance a federal appellate court struck a law on Second Amend-
ment grounds.1 In Parker, the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held the District of Columbia's firearm ordinance
infringed on the Second Amendment. The provisions at issue
banned handguns not registered prior to 1976, barred the move-
ment of registered handguns within one's home without a license,
and mandated all registered firearms be kept unloaded and either
locked or disassembled. Without equivocation, the D.C. Circuit
held the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
and bear arms.
The reverberations of this bombshell will extend far beyond
the banks of the Potomac. Prior to Parker, federal courts had
overwhelmingly construed the right to keep and bear arms as ex-
tending to state militias, not individuals. As militias are a relic of
a bygone era, such an interpretation renders the right to keep and
bear arms nugatory. The Supreme Court's near seventy-year si-
lence on the Second Amendment has permitted this reading to
persist. Parker shattered this solitude, as the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and will determine the parameters of the right
to keep and bear arms for the first time since 1939.
This article asserts three distinct, yet related points. First,
the D.C. Circuit's Second Amendment interpretation is correct as
a matter of law and liberty. Second, when the Supreme Court in-
terprets the Second Amendment, it should consider how states
have treated firearm rights. Third, as the Supreme Court is in-
creasingly using constitutional comparativism as an aid to inter-
* The author is an attorney practicing law at Kubasiak, Flystra, Thorpe & Rotunno in Chicago,
Illinois. He expresses gratitude to his family members for their guidance.
1. Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see David Nakamura & Robert
Barnes, D.C.'s Ban on Handguns in Homes Is Thrown out, Wash. Post A01 (Mar. 10, 2007).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case became D.C. v. Heller when the D.C. Circuit
found lead plaintiff Shelly Parker lacked standing. Parker, 478 F.3d at 375-78.
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pret the Constitution, it should address the consequences cur-
tailing firearm rights has wrought in other countries.
Pontificating on the Second Amendment has become a cottage
industry. The purpose of this piece is not to add another detailed
history of the right to keep and bear arms to the discussion. In-
stead, it examines the implications of Parker v. District of Colum-
bia. To this end, Part II presents a brief overview of Second
Amendment interpretations and case law.2 It then describes the
District of Columbia's firearm regulations and the Parker litiga-
tion.
Part III analyzes the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker.3 While
pilloried by many commentators, Parker is a welcome respite from
the gradual disintegration of the right to keep and bear arms.
Second Amendment rights of many Americans have been under-
mined, and in some instances eviscerated, for too long. Parker of-
fers the Supreme Court the opportunity to give the Second
Amendment an expansive interpretation and restore its guaran-
tees.
The remainder of this piece contemplates how the Supreme
Court will interpret the Second Amendment. When facing issues
of constitutional magnitude, the Court often considers two factors
in its arsenal of adjudication. The first is the legislative trends of
the States. The second is international law. This article does not
debate the merits of these approaches. Rather, it analyzes the
role these elements could play in a Second Amendment decision.
Part IV considers how national consensus influences the Su-
preme Court.4 It first explores states' constitutional and statutory
treatment of firearm rights. This section then examines cases in-
volving abortion, homosexual rights, the death penalty, and eu-
thanasia. The Court's invocation of national trends in these cases
is considered. This factor is elevated in matters of first impression
or where the Court revisits an issue. As the Court has not inter-
preted the Second Amendment since 1939, there is a compelling
basis to consider how States have grappled with gun rights in the
interim. Part IV concludes that the Court should maintain
consistency and examine the national consensus surrounding the
right to keep and bear arms. The social, legal, and legislative
trends coalesce around a robust individual right to keep and bear
arms. This consensus provides justification for the Court to ac-
2. See infra nn. 7-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra nn. 120-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra nn. 155-284 and accompanying text.
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knowledge the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right.
Constitutional comparativism is another element influencing
the Supreme Court. As Part V sets forth, the Court has consid-
ered the international community's treatment of issues such as
homosexual rights, affirmative action, and the death penalty.
5
Given this pattern, the Court could delve into foreign opinion con-
cerning firearms. If the Court is to consider the international
community's approach to firearm rights, it should look beyond the
recent pronouncements condemning firearms. While current
views are salient, past experiences are instructive. Part V exam-
ines instances of foreign governments undermining firearm
rights.6 History is scarred with examples of disarmament being
the prelude to atrocities. Too often, the nefarious nature of eradi-
cating guns is never given its proper due. The Court should ex-
plore this phenomenon, for a consideration of international views
would be incomplete without it.
An inherent inconsistency between the positions regarding
constitutional comparativism and national consensus must be ad-
dressed at the outset. The argument that current international
views should be downplayed takes the opposite stance of the claim
that recent state developments should be emphasized. This seem-
ingly conflicting line of reasoning can be rationalized. This article
does not advocate discounting the origins of the right to keep and
bear arms or ignoring eighteenth- and nineteenth-century firearm
regulations in interpreting the Second Amendment. It simply con-
tends that current national consensus is pertinent to the discus-
sion. Similarly, if the Court contemplates foreign jurisprudence
concerning firearms, contemporary international views are ger-
mane. However, the Court should also acknowledge the historical
realities of inhibiting individual firearm rights.
II. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: THE ROAD TO PARKER
The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."7 The D.C.
Circuit's decision in Parker v. District of Columbia is the most re-
cent federal appellate opinion interpreting the Second Amend-
5. See infra nn. 285-311 and accompanying text.
6. See infra nn. 324-81 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. Const. amend. II.
2008
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ment. To place it in proper perspective, one must consider the
various Second Amendment readings and the cases culminating
in Parker.
A. Interpreting the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Two competing Second Amendment interpretations envelop
the debate. These interpretations are the "individual right" and
the "collective right."8 Under the collective right reading, the Sec-
ond Amendment protects only the States' right to maintain a mili-
tia.9 As a result, an individual has no constitutionally protected
right to keep or bear arms. 10 Diametrically opposed to this read-
ing is the individual right model, which contends the Second
Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms,
independent of militia service.11 For support, individualists cite
the Second Amendment's text, the Framers' understanding of the
right, and the ubiquitous nature of firearms during colonial
times. 12
Some commentators denounce the individual versus collective
division as outmoded. 13 While the dichotomy remains, increased
attention to the Second Amendment has produced other interpre-
tations.' 4 One view that carries increasing currency is a deriva-
tion of the individualist reading, described as the "narrow individ-
8. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today? 76 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 291, 293-94 (2000); Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia". The Second Amend-
ment in Historical Perspective, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 195, 235 (2000); Glenn Harlan Reyn-
olds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 462-64 (1995).
9. Dorf, supra n. 8, at 293-94; Finkelman, supra n. 8, at 235; David Yassky, The Sec-
ond Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 588,
613-14 (2000).
10. Yassky, supra n. 9, at 613-14.
11. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 207-08 (1983).
12. Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second
Amendment, 29 Akron L. Rev. 57, 68-69 (1995).
13. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 889, 891 (2001) (examining the individualist and collectivist
theories and surmising "[bloth readings are wrong"). Some have contended this issue is
driven purely by the belief system of the arbiter and not by constitutional theory or inter-
pretation. One commentator notes, "[t]he choice is going to depend on the ideology of the
interpreter." Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: Putting the Gun Control Debate in So-
cial Perspective, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 481 (2004).
14. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Sec-
ond Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551, 554 (1991) (arguing the Second Amendment guaran-
teed the right of a virtuous and universal citizen militia to keep and bear arms, but today's
gun owners do not fit this description).
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ual right" model. 15 Under this theory, the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right to arms if the gun is related to par-
ticipation in a militia.16
This debate is not merely an academic exercise. Courts rou-
tinely parse legal scholarship to gain insight into Second Amend-
ment theories and to bolster their decisions. 17 The interpretations
disseminated by commentators have driven a discourse devoid of
modern-day Supreme Court contributions.
B. The United States Supreme Court and the
Second Amendment
The Supreme Court's interactions with the Second Amend-
ment are sparse.18 The Court has never explicitly incorporated
the right to keep and bear arms into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 9 This scenario is the product of two nineteenth-century
cases which held the Amendment was a limitation only upon the
federal government. 20 The Supreme Court directly addressed the
Amendment only once in the twentieth century. The Court's 1939
decision in United States v. Miller is the last time it considered a
Second Amendment challenge. 2' In Miller, authorities charged
two men with illegally transporting a shotgun having a barrel less
than eighteen inches, in violation of the National Firearms Act.22
The district court held that the law violated the Second Amend-
ment.23 The Supreme Court reversed. Offering scant rationale,
15. Robert Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley & Bryan Taylor, The Inconvenient Militia
Clause of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate
over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 St. John's J. Leg. Comment. 41, 56 (2002).
16. Id. at 56-57.
17. See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
18. But see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What
the Supreme Court Has Said about the Second Amendment, 18 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 99
(1999) (surveying 35 cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the Second Amend-
ment).
19. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637, 652-53
(1989).
20. Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 664-65 (1886) (holding the right to own and carry guns
does not include the right to carry guns in public as part of a group on a military parade);
U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding the Second Amendment "is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national govern-
ment, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-
citizens of the rights it recognizes," to police powers). See also David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 1359, 1459 (1998).
21. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
22. Id. at 175; The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801 et seq. (I.R.C. 1939).
23. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177.
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the Court stated that since there was no evidence the shotgun had
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument."24
Miller's brusque analysis could be attributed to the defen-
dants' failure to present an argument. 25 The defendants' position
was never briefed, suggesting the Court did not have a complete
record. 26 Nevertheless, the Court held the defendants could be
convicted because they presented no evidence the shotgun had
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."27 Because the record did not indicate
whether such a gun was an ordinary military weapon, the Court
remanded the case for fact-finding.28 One Second Amendment au-
thority concluded "while Miller held that the 'arms' protected by
the Second Amendment are arms suitable for militia use, it did
not question that the right is held by the individual."29 Despite
the Court's truncated analysis, Miller has been invoked to reject
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
C. Federal Circuit Courts and the Second Amendment
The Supreme Court's reluctance to expound on Miller specif-
ically, or the Second Amendment generally, has left the lower
courts to their own devices. The individual right interpretation
has not fared well in federal appellate courts until recently.
Under the auspices of Miller, courts have determined the right to
keep and bear arms extends only to state militias. The following
excerpts from federal circuit cases capture the collectivist legacy
spawned by Miller.
24. Id. at 178.
25. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2001). In lieu of a brief, counsel for
the Miller defendants sent a telegram to the Court "[s]uggest[ing] case be submitted on
[Government's] Brief." Stephen P. Halbrook, The Second Amendment in the Supreme
Court: Where It's Been and Where It's Going, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 449, 449 (2006).
26. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Pres-
ervation, 39 Ala. L. Rev. 103, 109 (1987) (citing lack of evidence, defendant's failure to
present an argument, and defendant's disappearance following trial court's dismissal of
their indictment as contributing to defendant's loss); Robert Dowlut, Federal and State
Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. Dayton L. Rev. 59, 73-74 (1989) (arguing that
Miller was defective due to the one-sided participation).
27. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
28. Id. at 183.
29. Halbrook, supra n. 25, at 454.
118 Vol. 69
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The First Circuit stated, "the federal government can limit
the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual."30 The
Third Circuit held the Second Amendment was "a protection for
the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations
against possible encroachments by the federal power."31 In Love
v. Pepersack, the Fourth Circuit determined the Second Amend-
ment "does not confer an absolute individual right to bear any
type of firearm."32 The Sixth Circuit held the Second Amendment
right applies only to state militias, stating "there can be no serious
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to pos-
sess a firearm."33 In Quilici v. Morton Grove, the Seventh Circuit
ruled "possession of handguns by individuals is not part of the
right to keep and bear arms."34 The Eighth Circuit found no "fun-
damental right to keep and bear arms in ... [the Second] amend-
ment."35 In Hickman v. Block, the Ninth Circuit ruled the right to
keep and bear arms is held by the states, not citizens.36 In the
Tenth Circuit, the right to keep and bear arms does not encom-
pass the right to possess a weapon.37 Finally, in United States v.
Wright, the Eleventh Circuit held the expression "well regulated
militia" referred "only to governmental militias that are actively
maintained and used for the common defense." 38 These cases left
no doubt as to where the federal courts of appeals stood.
At this juncture, an individual right to keep and bear arms
was a dead letter. Every circuit entertaining the question rejected
the individual right position. In 2001, the seminal case of United
States v. Emerson upset this placid state. 39 Emerson involved a
challenge to a law prohibiting individuals subject to a restraining
30. Cases v. U.S., 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). However, the First Circuit did
caution that the government "cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which
has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated mili-
tia." Id.
31. U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
32. Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995).
33. Stevens v. U.S., 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). The Sixth Circuit recently revis-
ited the issue in U.S. v. Napier, where it found no reason to depart from its precedent that
the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right to bear arms. U.S. v.
Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir. 2000).
34. Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982).
35. U.S. v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988).
36. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
38. U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 1997). While the Second Circuit has
not explicitly ruled on the issue, it has noted gun possession is not a fundamental right.
U.S. v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
2008 119
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order from carrying a handgun.40 While the Fifth Circuit upheld
the law, it was the court's Second Amendment pronouncements
that made headlines. 41 The Emerson court reasoned that the
word "people" used in the Second Amendment was no different
from the other amendments, and thus it denoted individuals, not
state governments. 42 The Fifth Circuit held the Second Amend-
ment guaranteed an individual's right to keep and bear arms.4 3 A
shock to the system, Emerson resuscitated a constitutional right
that had been on life support.
The Fifth Circuit's expansive reading was given a mixed re-
ception by its sister circuits. 44  In the 2002 case Silveira v.
Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit upheld a California state ban on as-
sault weapons, basing its holding on a previous Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, Hickman v. Block. 45 Despite the settled nature of the Second
Amendment in the Ninth Circuit, the Silveira court felt compelled
to justify its stance in light of Emerson. The Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed the Amendment conferred only a collective right, conclud-
ing it "was adopted in order to protect the people from the threat
of federal tyranny by preserving the right of the states to arm
their militias. "46
A year after the Ninth Circuit decided Silveira, it entertained
a challenge to a law prohibiting gun shows in Nordyke v. King.
47
Rejecting the challenge, the court followed Silveira in ruling that
the Second Amendment protected only a collective right.48 How-
ever, the Nordyke panel expressed discomfort with the analysis
and holding of Silveira and noted that, if not bound by precedent,
40. Id. at 211-12.
41. Lyle Denniston, Individuals Have Gun Rights, Court Says Long-Awaited Case De-
parts from Long Practice in the US, Boston Globe A5 (Oct. 17, 2001); William Yelverton,
The Shot Heard around the U.S.A., Tampa Trib. 2 (Oct. 21, 2001).
42. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227-28.
43. Id. at 264-65.
44. The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have considered appeals which sought to
follow the holding of Emerson. See e.g. U.S. v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S.
v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Price, 328 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2003). In all
three instances, the challenges were brought by criminal defendants and rejected by the
courts, which declined to consider adopting Emerson. In none of the situations did the
court lament or laud the Fifth Circuit's ruling.
45. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2002); Hickman v. Block, 81
F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996). For an analysis ofSilveira v. Lockyer, see Roy Lucas, From Patsone
& Miller to Silveira v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms, 26 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev.
257 (2004).
46. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1086-87.
47. Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003).
48. Id. at 1191-92.
Vol. 69120
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it "may be inclined to follow the approach of the Fifth Circuit in
Emerson."49 This veiled support notwithstanding, the Fifth Cir-
cuit stood alone until the D.C. Circuit stepped into the fray and
addressed the constitutionality of the Washington, D.C. gun regu-
lation.
D. The District of Columbia's Firearm Ordinance
The United States Congress passed the Home Rule Act in
1973, granting the District of Columbia greater self-determina-
tion.50 Home Rule proved a catalyst for extensive gun regulation.
In 1976, the Council of the District of Columbia considered a bill
restricting city residents from possessing handguns. 51 The impe-
tus was the proliferation of gun-related deaths; experts testified to
the Council that in 1974, handguns were used in 155 of 285
murders in the District of Columbia. 52 In 1975, handguns were
used in 695 aggravated assaults, 3,405 robberies, and 133
murders. 53
These figures prompted the D.C. Council to enact the most
far-reaching regulatory scheme in the nation. The District re-
quires all firearms to be registered. However, this registration re-
quirement is a facade vis-A-vis handguns, as the District prohibits
registration certificates for handguns not registered before Sep-
tember 24, 1976. 54 Those firearms that are licensed are subject to
additional restrictions. Each firearm must be "unloaded and dis-
assembled or bound by a trigger lock."55 The District further pro-
hibits moving lawfully-owned handguns within one's own home
49. Id. at 1191.
50. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
51. Meg Smith, A History of Gun Control, Wash. Post C4 (Mar. 11, 2007).
52. See Katharine E. Kohm, Parker v. D.C.: Putting the "I's" in Militia, 42 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 807, 815 n. 39 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (West 2007) ("A registration certificate shall not be is-
sued for a: ... (4) Pistol not validly registered to the current registrant in the District prior
to September 24, 1976."); Id. at § 7-2501.01(12) (" 'Pistol' means any firearm originally de-
signed to be fired by use of a single hand.").
55. Id. at § 7-2507.02 (stating that "each registrant shall keep any firearm in his pos-
session unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless such
firearm is kept at his place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes
within the District of Columbia").
2008 121
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without a permit.56 While not challenged by the plaintiffs in
Parker, the District also proscribes carrying firearms in public.
57
Violations of these provisions are punishable by a $1,000 fine,
one year's imprisonment, or both.58 A second offense carries a
$5,000 fine, five years' imprisonment, or both.59 The District
strictly enforces these provisions. The city has charged victims of
home invasions who used guns in self-defense for violating fire-
arm regulations. 60
E. Parker v. District of Columbia
The provisions enacted in 1976 remained unaltered when six
individuals brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the District
of Columbia in February of 2003.61 The plaintiffs included George
Lyon who wanted a gun in his home because "[g]uns are a tool,
and they have a use. The use is protection and security. '62 Plain-
tiff Shelly Parker sought a gun to ward off neighborhood drug
dealers angered by her anti-drug activism.63 Plaintiff Dick Heller
carried a handgun while on duty as a District of Columbia Special
Police Officer guarding the Federal Judicial Center.64 But when
he applied for a registration certificate to own a handgun, the Dis-
trict denied his request. 65
The plaintiffs' twenty-four-paragraph complaint alleged the
District of Columbia infringed on their right to possess a personal
firearm in their home, as guaranteed by the Second Amend-
56. Id. at § 22-4504.
57. Id. at §§ 22-4504, -4515. ("No person shall carry within the District of Columbia
either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursu-
ant to District of Columbia law."); Id. at § 22-4515 ("Any violation of any provision of this
chapter for which no penalty is specifically provided shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.").
58. Id. at § 7-2507.06.
59. Id. at § 7-2507.06(2)(A).
60. Appellant's Br. at 60, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
http://www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/appellantsbrief.pdf). Two exam-
ples of such prosecutions are described in the following articles: Barton Gellman, Rowan
Gun Case in Jury's Hands, Wash. Post D1 (Sept. 29, 1988); Jim Keary, Intruder Shot in
Home on Hill; Residence Had Been Burglarized Last Week, Wash. Times C9 (Feb. 5, 1997).
61. PI.'s Compl., Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at http:/l
www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/complaint.pdf).
62. Elissa Silverman & Allison Klein, Plaintiffs Reflect on Gun Ruling; Residents Suing
D.C. Explain Motivation, Wash. Post C1 (Mar. 11, 2007).
63. Id.
64. Appellant's Br. at 4-5, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/appellantsbrief.pdf).
65. Id.
Vol. 69
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ment.66 The plaintiffs took aim at the aforementioned provisions
of the D.C. Code pertaining to the licensing, storing, and trans-
porting of firearms. 67 The plaintiffs averred that the city's en-
forcement of laws banning the "possession of handguns and func-
tional firearms within the home, forbidding otherwise lawful self-
defense usage of arms, and forbidding the movement of a handgun
on an individual's property," violated their Second Amendment
rights.68 The District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Sec-
ond Amendment conferred no individual right to possess a fire-
arm.
6 9
1. The District Court's Decision
Finding that Dick Heller had standing to challenge the regu-
lations because the District denied him a permit, the D.C. District
Court began its Second Amendment analysis with United States v.
Miller.70 The district court seized on the Supreme Court's reti-
cence post-Miller.71 It inferred the Supreme Court's refusal to ad-
dress the federal courts of appeals' collective right reading as tacit
approval. 72 The district court cited Seegars v. Ashcroft, another
D.C. District Court decision issued two months earlier which dis-
missed a similar challenge to the District's firearm regulations. 73
Seegars rejected the individual right theory and concluded "the
District of Columbia is not a state within the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment and therefore the Second Amendment's reach
does not extend to it." 74 After invoking Seegars, the Parker court
confronted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Emerson. The court es-
chewed the merits of Emerson, and instead addressed the Emer-
son court's purported failure to adhere to Fifth Circuit prece-
dent.75 The district court claimed it did not "place a great deal of
reliance on the stability of Emerson even within the Fifth Cir-
66. Pl.'s Compl. at 4, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at http://
www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/complaint.pdf).
67. Id. at 5-6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 5, Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (available at
http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/DefsMotiontoDismissBrief.pdf).
70. Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 104 (D.D.C. 2004).
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id.
73. Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004).
74. Id. at 239. The D.C. Circuit later affirmed Seegars, holding that the litigants were
not threatened with criminal prosecution and thus lacked standing. Seegars v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
75. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
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cuit."76 However, the district court did not acknowledge the Fifth
Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in Emerson.
77
The district court found additional guidance from the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, which held "the Second Amend-
ment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right."
78
While the D.C. Court of Appeals had interpreted the Second
Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had not. The district court noted the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld a statute prohibiting domestic violence offenders from
possessing a gun in Fraternal Order of Police v. U.S.79 However,
the D.C. Circuit declined to address the Second Amendment's
scope because there was no evidence showing a relationship be-
tween the plaintiffs' gun possession and the preservation of a mili-
tia.80 Based on Fraternal Order of Police, the district court rea-
soned "the D.C. Circuit is likely to reject the notion that the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees an individual's right to bear arms."
8 1
The district court found no individual right to keep and bear arms
separate from service in the militia, and because the plaintiffs did
not assert membership in the militia, granted the motion to dis-
miss.8 2
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, arguing
the District's ordinance banned the possession of functional fire-
arms within their homes.8 3 The thrust of their appeal was the
Supreme Court's treatment of the phrase "the people," as articu-
lated in the Bill of Rights. The appellants highlighted the Court's
refusal to distinguish between "the people" of the Second Amend-
ment and "the people" of the other amendments.8 4 They argued
76. Id. at 107-08.
77. U.S. v. Emerson, 281 F.3d 1281 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying the petition for rehearing
en banc).
78. Sandidge v. U.S., 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. App. 1987) (quoting U.S. v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976)).
79. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (citing Fraternal Or. of Police v. U.S., 173 F.3d 898,
906 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
80. Fraternal Or. of Police, 173 F.3d at 906.
81. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Appellants' Br. at 16, Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis
in original). The D.C. Circuit would later define "functional firearms" as guns "readily ac-
cessible when necessary for self defense in the home." Parker, 478 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
84. Appellants' Br. at 27, Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004).
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that history, case law, and the Amendment's text support the indi-
vidual right reading.
The District countered that its ordinance did not ban fire-
arms, but merely prohibited "a narrow type of weaponry."8' 5 More-
over, handguns were not integral to militia service, and such guns
had a propensity for being used in criminal activities.8 6 The Dis-
trict's textual analysis emphasized the militaristic overtones of
the Second Amendment as confirmation of the collective right in-
terpretation. Not until the waning paragraphs of its brief did the
District argue its non-state status rendered the Second Amend-
ment inapplicable.8 7
A divided D.C. Circuit struck down the regulations.8 8 The
D.C. Circuit began its opinion with the determination that Heller
had standing to challenge the ordinance because the denial of his
registration certificate constituted an injury-in-fact.8 9 Moving to
the merits, the court described the District's position "to be that
the Second Amendment is a dead letter."90 This summarization
was not an exaggeration, as the city contended at oral argument
that it could legally ban all firearms outright. 91 The court ex-
amined the varying interpretations of the Second Amendment, in-
cluding state appellate courts' readings of the Amendment, which
the court felt "offer[ed] a more balanced picture."92 Determining
circuit and Supreme Court case law was devoid of definitive guid-
ance, the D.C. Circuit began its dissection of the Second Amend-
ment.93
Contrary to the District's affinity for the phrase "bear arms,"
the court found "the people" most dispositive. 94 Using the decep-
tively simple but doctrinally sound reading that "the people" used
in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments referred to
85. Appellees' Br. at 12, Parker v. D.C., 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal
quotes omitted).
86. Id. at 15-16. While remarking the plaintiffs' policy arguments were "addressed to
the wrong forum," the District did not hesitate to devote a few pages of its brief to the
subject of gun violence.
87. Id. at 38.
88. Parker, 478 F.3d at 396, petition for rehearing en banc denied, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11029. The opinion noted that Circuit Judges Randolph, Rogers, Tatel, and Gar-
land would grant the petition. Id.
89. Parker, 478 F.3d at 376.
90. Id. at 378.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 380.
93. Id. at 380-81.
94. Id. at 381.
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individual rights, the court discerned no reason why the Second
Amendment should be different. For support, the D.C. Circuit
cited a Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez.95 In
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court noted "the people" protected by the
First, Second, and Fourth Amendments "refers to a class of per-
sons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community."96 This language convinced the D.C. Cir-
cuit that the Second Amendment guaranteed individual protec-
tions indistinguishable from other amendments.
97
Finding an individual right to keep and bear arms, the court
made its second critical determination. The court resolved "the
right to keep and bear arms was not created by government, but
rather preserved by it."98 The court articulated the basis of this
right as twofold: private purposes such as self-defense and hunt-
ing and the public purpose of militia service.99
After making these determinations, the court responded to
the District's reading of the Second Amendment's operative
clause. Admitting the phrase "bear arms" had a militaristic con-
notation, the court pointed to a number of examples of its use in
non-military contexts. 100 The court further objected to the Dis-
trict's Second Amendment interpretation because "the plain
meaning of 'keep' strikes a mortal blow to the collective right the-
ory."10 1 The court's elevation of the individualistic components of
the Amendment, "the people" and "keep," pervaded its interpreta-
tion and foreshadowed its ultimate holding. 10
2
Turning to the Amendment's prefatory clause, the court high-
lighted the parties' divergent understanding of "a well regulated
Militia."1 0 3 The appellants envisioned a loosely formed, ad hoc
group while the District regarded the militia as a well-organized
and regimented fighting force. 10 4 The court likened the militia's
rudimentary enrollment requirements to the current Selective
95. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (citing U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
96. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
97. Parker, 478 F.3d at 382.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 383.
100. Id. at 384-85.
101. Id. at 386.
102. Id.
103. Parker, 478 F.3d at 386.
104. Id.
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Service Act.105 The court concluded "a well regulated Militia" was
not a select group of men, but a majority of the general male popu-
lation.1 0 6
Establishing the foundation for its individual right interpre-
tation, the court addressed the import of U.S. v. Miller.10 7 Follow-
ing the Fifth Circuit in Emerson, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the
Miller Court's implicit refusal to adopt the government's collective
right theory. 108 The court concluded that Miller supported the in-
dividual right interpretation, 10 9 reasoning that if the Miller Court
endorsed the collective right reading, it would have highlighted
the defendants' lack of militia affiliation. 110
In summary, the D.C. Circuit read the Second Amendment as
standing for two propositions.' The right to keep and bear arms
has individual and civic justifications. The individual basis en-
compasses one's right to keep arms for self-defense and hunting.
The civic or collective rationale entails responsibilities relating to
the militia. Through this prism, the D.C. Circuit struck the chal-
lenged provisions as violating the Second Amendment.1 12
The court's application of the Second Amendment to the re-
strictions was anticlimactic. In finding the three provisions un-
constitutional, the court disposed of each with a single paragraph.
Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) of the D.C. Code was unconstitutional be-
cause handguns fell under the rubric of "arms" as referenced in
the Second Amendment, and thus the District could not ban
them.1 13 Contravening the District's argument that handguns
furthered criminality, the court noted that handguns were the
preferred firearm "for protection of one's home and family."1 4
The court was similarly succinct in discarding the ban on moving
registered handguns within one's home. Invalidating § 22-4504,
the court reasoned that "[s]uch a restriction would negate the law-
ful use upon which the [Second Amendment] was premised-i.e.,
105. Id. at 387 (citing The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West 1990)
(mandating that all American males register upon reaching the age of 18 as a contingency
should the draft be reintroduced)).
106. Id. at 389.
107. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
108. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 225 (5th Cir. 2001).
109. Parker, 478 F.3d at 394.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 395.
112. Id. at 399-401.
113. Id. at 400.
114. Id.
2008
15
Keleher: The Impending Storm
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2008
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
self-defense." 115 The court again relied on the self-defense justifi-
cation to strike down § 7-2507.02, which mandated that a firearm
be kept unloaded and disassembled or locked. Because this re-
quirement "amounts to a complete prohibition" on using a gun for
self-defense, it violated the Second Amendment. 116
The court's decision provoked a dissenting opinion by Judge
Henderson. She disputed the propriety of entertaining the appel-
lants' challenge, calling the Second Amendment's meaning in the
District of Columbia "purely academic."' 17 Citing the district
court's decision in Seegars v. Ashcroft, the dissent proclaimed the
District was not a State for Second Amendment purposes "and
therefore the Second Amendment's reach does not extend to it."118
The dissent found support in U.S. v. Miller, reading it to provide
the Second Amendment "relates to those Militia whose continued
vitality is required to safeguard the individual States."" 9 Other
than this reliance on Miller to argue the Second Amendment only
implicated States, the dissent refused to challenge the majority's
individual right interpretation.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF PARKER V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The Second Amendment guarantees a profound right with in-
herent responsibilities. Like any other right, it is subject to rea-
sonable restrictions. But leaving the Second Amendment to the
whims of politicians motivated more by political polls than consti-
tutional considerations places it in a vulnerable position. The
Washington, D.C. firearm ordinance reflects this reality as the
Second Amendment has been in abeyance in the District since the
Bicentennial.
The ordinance challenged in Parker is not a regulation, a re-
striction, or an inhibition. It is a ban that tramples over the Sec-
ond Amendment rights of the District's residents. The ordinance
is inimical to the Constitution and the beliefs espoused by its au-
thors. Its blatancy is no less transparent than a law prohibiting
speech critical of the government. The requirement that firearms
be kept unloaded and disassembled renders self-defense even in
one's home a nullity. Prohibiting the transfer of a gun between
rooms in a home is the height of intrusiveness. The District's
115. Parker, 478 F.3d at 400.
116. Id. at 401.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 401-02 (quoting Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 239 (D.D.C. 2004)).
119. Id. at 403-04.
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scheme leaves its law-abiding citizens nothing more than "second
class citizens." 120 Parker eradicates this stigma. The D.C. Cir-
cuit's reading is a straightforward interpretation that infuses a
desperately needed dose of common sense into the Second Amend-
ment debate.
A. The Majority Opinion in Parker v. District of Columbia
The majority's view of the District's ordinance was colored by
the extreme position embraced by the District at oral argument.
The District contended it had an unobstructed right to regulate
firearms, including outlawing them. That the Second Amendment
was, in the District's eyes, "a dead letter," may have doomed its
prospects.
The D.C. Circuit exposed the collective right reading for its
amendment-eviscerating tendencies. Stripped to its essentials,
the collective right theory provides that the militia's obsolescence
obviates any constitutional protections. In other words, the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees rights relating only to militias, but
since such institutions are defunct, the Second Amendment is an
anachronism that protects no rights in modern day America. The
court found this outcome disturbing. The court's concern with the
practical consequences of endorsing the collective right reading
was justified. The underlying message of the collective right in-
terpretation is subtle but unmistakable: the people cannot be
trusted with the right to possess a gun. The collectivist notion
further undermines the noble purpose of the Second Amendment,
which charges individuals with the duty to defend themselves and
their country. The D.C. Circuit understood that if the right to
bear arms as a militia member in defense of a public force is per-
mitted, it should encompass the right to keep arms as an individ-
ual in self-defense against a private force. Arms for personal de-
fense are a natural corollary of arms for a public defense.
1. Recognizing the Evolution of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms
Parker's rationale takes a page from the "living Constitution"
framework. This is logical, as the Second Amendment discussion
parallels the living Constitution debate. The living Constitution
120. Stephen Halbrook, Second Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 5 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rights L.J. 105, 106 (1995).
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theory posits that the Constitution is a malleable document sub-
ject to reinterpretation as times change and society evolves. 121 If
one accepts the Constitution as living and evolving, then the col-
lective right theory is of negligible worth. There is no dispute the
state militia is non-existent today. However, the basis for mili-
tias-defending against aggression-is still relevant.
The living Constitution theory would acknowledge this criti-
cal function is effectuated not by militias, but by the widespread
ownership of firearms. Millions of Americans rely on firearms to
defend themselves and their families. This evolution establishes
that the collective right reading is outmoded because it relies on a
relic to the disregard of current societal norms. Thus, under the
living Constitution approach, individual gun ownership furthers
the right of self-defense and the maintenance of a free State. The
obsolescence of militias coupled with the predominance of fire-
arms used for self-defense warrants this result. Viewing the col-
lective right interpretation through a living Constitution lens
leads to the inescapable conclusion that such an incongruous read-
ing does not comport with modern day realities. While the D.C.
Circuit did not apply the living Constitution theory, the court's
reasoning contains traces of this framework.
Expansive constitutional readings have become de rigueur.
Courts have extended the First and Fourth Amendments to pro-
tect mediums and venues inconceivable in colonial times. Simi-
larly, the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to encom-
pass guarantees like "liberty of the person both in its spatial and
more transcendent dimensions" that are amorphous in scope and
untraceable in origin. 122 Given this progression, the Second
Amendment should be evaluated in a similar vein. The collective
right theory is a retrograde reading because it suffers from the
dual defects of contracting individual rights and ignoring the
evolution of society. The D.C. Circuit's Second Amendment inter-
pretation recognized the collective right reading's shortcomings
and reflected the evolution of firearm rights.
2. Considering the States' Treatment of Firearm Rights
Unlike most federal appellate courts, the D.C. Circuit identi-
fied state appellate courts endorsing the individual right read-
121. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Consti-
tution", 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1463 (2001).
122. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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ing.123 In sharp contrast to the near-unanimous approach of fed-
eral courts, seven state appellate courts endorse the individual
right reading while ten follow the collective right approach.
124
The recognition of state courts' treatment of the right to keep and
bear arms only scratches the surface. As the following section sets
forth, the vast majority of state constitutions provide for an indi-
vidual right to possess a firearm. 125 Furthermore, the legislative
trends of the States favor an expansive reading of individual fire-
arm rights. 126 The D.C. Circuit hinted that the federal courts' re-
fusal to recognize individual gun rights is not universally em-
braced. Greater scrutiny would uncover how isolated the federal
courts are. While the D.C. Circuit refrained from addressing the
national consensus concerning the right to keep and bear arms,
the Supreme Court might not.
3. D.C. Circuit's Evaluation of Supreme Court Precedent
The only foible of the D.C. Circuit's opinion is the conclusory
fashion in which the court asserted "no direct precedent [in] the
Supreme Court... provides us with a square holding on the ques-
tion . . ",127 These words were belied by the court's analysis, as
Miller was the D.C. Circuit's focal point. However, while the court
devoted substantial attention to the opaque, but no less binding
Miller, it was distilled through an informative rather than author-
itative vein. Even if the Supreme Court admits the dissension
generated by Miller is justified, it might rebuke the D.C. Circuit
for demoting its decision.
The Parker court's treatment of Miller is understandable.
Miller offers a Second Amendment starting point, but little else.
Miller's terse opinion borrows more than it offers. Moreover, the
backgrounds of Miller and Parker are dissimilar. While the D.C.
Circuit did not raise this point, it bears noting that the Miller
Court faced a Second Amendment challenge by criminal defend-
ants. Additionally, the regulation in Miller was just that. The un-
derlying law restricted only transporting certain types of guns. In
sharp contrast, Parker involves a ban on possessing a functional
firearm in one's home. Thus, the federal statute challenged in
123. Parker, 478 F.3d at 406.
124. Id. at 380, n. 6.
125. See infra nn. 157-84 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Parker, 478 F.3d at 380-81.
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Miller is worlds away from the D.C. ordinance. These factual and
legal distinctions cannot be swept aside.
Miller was not the only Supreme Court decision considered by
the Parker court. The D.C. Circuit found guidance in the Court's
pronouncement from U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez12 that "the peo-
ple" referenced in the Second Amendment were indistinguishable
from "the people" depicted in the First and Fourth Amend-
ments. 129 While the Supreme Court admitted its "textual exegesis
is by no means conclusive,"' 130 it is difficult to conclude the D.C.
Circuit's reliance was misplaced. If the Drafters intended the mi-
litia to be a special subset of individuals, it could have articulated
these sentiments. However, as with the other amendments, they
used the general term "the people." Such a reality renders a sui
generis reading of the Second Amendment harder to sustain. The
D.C. Circuit acknowledged this: "The Second Amendment would
be an inexplicable aberration if it were not read to protect individ-
ual rights as well." 131 The D.C. Circuit's contention that "the peo-
ple" described in the Bill of Rights should be read consistently is
an island of analytical simplicity in a sea of constitutional com-
plexities.
4. Applying the Natural Rights Theory to the Debate
The D.C. Circuit made another significant conclusion in its
Second Amendment interpretation. Treading on the periphery of
natural rights, the court stated the "the right to keep and bear
arms was not created by the government, but rather preserved by
it."132 Commentators often recite the numerous firearm restric-
tions enacted throughout English history and during the colonial
period. While these examples challenge the notion that colonists
had an unencumbered right to possess a firearm, their force is di-
minished when the natural right theory is raised. For these
prohibitions do not alter the axiom that individuals have a natural
right to keep arms for self-defense. Once the D.C. Circuit enunci-
ated this reading, arguments invoking the historical precedent for
gun restrictions lost their strength.
The D.C. Circuit's pre-existing right theory has an inherent
appeal. Blackstone articulated the English right to arms as an
128. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
129. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265).
130. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
131. Parker, 478 F.3d at 382.
132. Id. at 390.
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"auxiliary" one needed "to protect and maintain inviolate the
three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal lib-
erty, and private property."133 Man's yearning to defend himself,
his home, and his freedom is no less palpable today. The right to
protect oneself, whether against a street criminal or tyrannical
government, is preserved in the scheme of ordered liberty. These
are basic individual concerns that transcend any collectivist ab-
straction. The founders recognized this innate desire and tran-
scribed it in the Bill of Rights. The D.C. Circuit's pre-existing
right theory respects these principles.
Parsing the grammar of the Second Amendment does not al-
ter the fact that firearms were a fixture of early America. Fire-
arms served the function of feeding and protecting families. The
right to possess arms was assumed for sport, hunting, and self-
defense, in addition to militia duties. This picture coincides with
the Parker court's holding that the right to keep and bear arms is
a pre-existing right. An explicit right to use a gun to protect one's
family was unnecessary because this was a natural, inherent right
enjoyed by the people. As one commentator notes, "the most plau-
sible reason for such silence is that the right to use private arms
for personal self-defense was simply taken for granted by the
Framers."134 Reading the Second Amendment to prohibit people
from keeping firearms in their homes is counterintuitive to the
principles of liberty and limited government held by the Framers.
Parker ameliorated this transgression.
B. The Dissenting Opinion in Parker v. District of Columbia
A dissent that chastises the majority for being too thorough is
a rare occurrence. Yet this is how the Parker dissent opens: "ex-
haustive opinions on the origin, purpose, and scope of the Second
Amendment . . . have proven irresistible to the federal judici-
ary."135 The dissent's fascination with the longevity and history of
the majority's opinion as a detriment is noteworthy. The major-
ity's elaboration adds to, rather than detracts from, the strength
of the opinion.
133. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, **136-39 (Wayne Morrison ed., Caven-
dish Publg. Ltd.).
134. Jerry Bonanno, Facing the Lion in the Bush: Exploring the Implications of Adopting
an Individual Rights Interpretation of the Second Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 463, 478 (2006).
135. Parker, 478 F.3d at 401 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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The Parker dissent is notable not for what it says, but for
what it does not. The dissent avoids the threshold issue presented
by the case, as the singular focus of the dissent is the District's
non-state status. Thus, exchange between the dissent and the
majority is negligible. The dissent's premise is straightforward:
because the District is not a state within the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment, it forecloses any analysis of what the right to
keep and bear arms entails. Instead of addressing the majority's
Second Amendment interpretation, the dissent places all of its
eggs in the federal district basket. The dissent's focus is remarka-
ble given the low priority the District afforded the issue. The Dis-
trict did not raise the Amendment's inapplicability until the wan-
ing paragraphs of its brief. The District's perfunctory analysis of
the issue further accentuates the lack of confidence it had in this
argument.
U.S. v. Miller136 is the basis for the dissent's reading that the
Second Amendment does not encompass the District.137 The dis-
sent notes that Miller emphasizes "the declaration and guarantee
of the Second Amendment . . . must be interpreted and applied
together."138 The dissent uses this reading to conclude the indi-
vidual component cannot be isolated or elevated, and thus the
Amendment's "character and aim do not require that we treat the
District as a State. 1 39
In holding the Second Amendment is inapplicable to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the dissent adopts an outdated position. The
Supreme Court has ruled on the applicability of the Bill of Rights
to the District. In Callan v. Wilson, the Court held that the consti-
tutional protections enshrined in the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments were "secured for the benefit of all the people of the United
States, as well as those permanently or temporarily residing in
the District of Columbia as those residing or being in the several
states."140 The Court found nothing "to justify the assertion that
the people of this District may be lawfully deprived of the benefit
of any of the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and prop-
erty.141 In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court upheld the application of
due process principles to District residents. 142 Noting that States
136. U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
137. Id.
138. Parker, 478 F.3d at 402 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
139. Id. at 406 (internal citations omitted).
140. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1888).
141. Id. at 550.
142. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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were prohibited from maintaining segregated public schools, the
Bolling Court reasoned, "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern-
ment."143 The Court again echoed these sentiments in Pernell v.
Southall Realty, where it held "like other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, [the Seventh Amendment] is fully applicable to courts es-
tablished by Congress in the District of Columbia. ' 144
The dissent eschews these lessons and instead seizes on dis-
tinctions between the District and the States that have no import
on the Second Amendment. The dissent's reliance on Adams v.
Clinton 45 embodies this point.' 46 In Adams, the Supreme Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit's holding that the Constitution did not
guarantee District citizens the right to vote for members of Con-
gress because the District did not constitute a "State" within the
Constitution's voting clauses. 147 The concerns implicated in Ad-
ams did not turn on individual rights, but the complexities of the
District's unique status and the voting issues inherent in such in-
tricacies. The question raised in Adams went to the heart of the
District's origins and purpose. In contrast, the Second Amend-
ment encapsulates an individual guarantee overriding any state-
district distinction.
Similarly, the dissent's dependence on Lee v. Flintkote and
LaShawn v. Barry does not carry the day.' 48 In Lee, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held "the District, unlike the states, has no reserved power to
be guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment."1 49 In LaShawn, the
D.C. Circuit held the Eleventh Amendment had no application to
the District. 150 The rights at stake in these two cases did not in-
volve individual guarantees set forth in the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. Thus, the case law cited by the dis-
sent fosters the illusion that individual protections are in abey-
ance in the District. The dissent's reliance on cases concerning
voting rights, the Tenth Amendment, and the Eleventh Amend-
ment is a narrow reed upon which to base the contention that an
individual right has no application in the District.
143. Id.
144. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974).
145. Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000), affd, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).
146. Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
147. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
148. Parker, 478 F.3d at 406; Lee v. Flintkote, 593 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979); LaShawn
v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
149. Lee, 593 F.2d at 1278.
150. LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1397-98.
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The dissent's position is further weakened by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' refusal to rely on the District's status
to reject Second Amendment challenges. In Sandidge v. U.S., the
D.C. Court of Appeals held the Second Amendment protects the
right of the state to bear arms, not the individual. 15 1 The court
did not address whether the District's non-state status rendered
the Amendment inapplicable. 15 2 The court reaffirmed Sandidge
in the 2003 decision of Barron v. U.S.153 Thus, the dissent's novel
proposition that the District is beyond the reach of the Second
Amendment has not been embraced by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
The dissent's anachronistic reading that provisions of the Bill
of Rights are inapplicable to the District is a microcosm of the col-
lective right approach. The collective right theory stands the idea
of expanding constitutional protections on its head. Condensed
readings of constitutional guarantees fell out of favor. Constitu-
tional rights have undergone extensive evolution and their reach
has seen significant dilation in recent years. A Second Amend-
ment interpretation should expand rather than contract individ-
ual rights. The rhetoric of the collective right reading does not
reflect the reality of modern constitutional jurisprudence. The
dissent suffers from this same failing.
One cannot ignore the Supreme Court's post-1950s expansive
view of Constitutional rights. As Judge Alex Kozinski admon-
ished in a Second Amendment case, "[i]f we adopt a jurisprudence
sympathetic to individual rights, we must give broad compass to
all constitutional provisions that protect individuals from tyr-
anny."1 54 It would be perverse to have a scenario in which the
Court reads certain rights into the Constitution while it reads the
right to keep and bear arms out of the Constitution. This enig-
matic approach downplays the written text and exalts the judge's
interpretive beliefs. The dissent's truncated approach ignores Su-
preme Court precedent that expands constitutional protections
and applies the Bill of Rights to the District. These defects per-
vade the dissent's position and underscore the logic of the major-
ity's holding. How the Supreme Court considers the D.C. Circuit's
decision and delineates the contours of the Second Amendment is
the subject of the remainder of this article.
151. Sandidge v. U.S., 520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. App. 1987).
152. Id.
153. Barron v. U.S., 818 A.2d 987, 994 n. 7 (D.C. App. 2003).
154. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
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IV. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE SECOND
AMENDMENT DEBATE
Legal scholarship has not broached how national consensus
impacts the right to keep and bear arms. Yet, national consensus
is of fundamental importance because the Supreme Court has
used it in various constitutional contexts. Since the Court has not
grappled with the Second Amendment in almost seventy years,
the States' treatment of firearm rights in the meantime is instruc-
tive.
Although the District of Columbia is not a "State," it is of little
consequence for purposes of this discussion. The District is en-
compassed in the national consensus. It is an autonomous entity
with its own jurisdiction and legislative and judicial bodies. Chief
Justice John Marshall described it as "a distinct political soci-
ety."155 The District's views are as relevant as those of any State.
When considering national consensus, the Supreme Court in-
cludes the District in its survey. 15 6 Moreover, a Second Amend-
ment interpretation will impact the entire country, not just the
District of Columbia. Thus, the national consensus concerning
firearm rights is a pertinent element in the adjudication of Parker.
A. States and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
While the Second Amendment is read narrowly in federal
courts, an individual right to keep and bear arms has found a
more conducive atmosphere in the state realm. As the D.C. Cir-
cuit noted in Parker, seven state appellate courts endorse the indi-
vidual right view. 157 Furthermore, most state constitutions grant
an individual right to keep and bear arms. The state constitutions
fall into three categories: 5 8 thirty-six states provide an explicit
155. Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445, 452 (1805).
156. See e.g. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 344 (2001).
157. Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 380 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (referring to Hilberg v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo. App. 1988); Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d
343, 347 n. 5 (Ky. 2006); State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (La. 2001); State v.
Nickerson, 247 P.2d 188, 192 (Mont. 1952); Stillwell v. Stillwell, 2001 WL 862620, at *4
(Tenn. App. July 30, 2001); State v. Anderson, 2000 WL 122218, at *7 n. 3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 26, 2000); State v. Williams, 148 P.3d 993, 998 (Wash. 2006); Rohrbaugh v. State,
607 S.E.2d 404, 412 (W. Va. 2004)).
158. Robert A. Creamer, History Is Not Enough: Using Contemporary Justifications for
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpreting the Second Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev.
905, 920-25 (2004).
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individual right to keep and bear arms; 159 eight states emulate
the Second Amendment, 160 and six states do not expressly provide
for the right to keep and bear arms. 161
The substantial number of state constitutions recognizing an
individual right to keep and bear arms is significant. Even more
salient is the states' direction. In each instance, states strength-
ened an individual right to keep and bear arms. 62 Since 1978,
twelve states have amended or added provisions granting the
right to keep and bear arms.163 The following examples evince
this development. In 1994, Alaska amended its Constitution to
provide "[tihe individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be
denied or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the
State."1 64 Delaware enacted a provision in 1987 stating, "[a] per-
son has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self,
family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use."165
The State of Maine was blunt in its assessment that "[e]very citi-
zen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be
questioned."'166 Finally, West Virginia amended its Constitution
in 1986 to read "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for
159. Id. at 921 (listing the following state constitutions: Ala. Const. art. I, § 26; Alaska
Const. art. I, § 19; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 26; Colo. Const. art. II, § 13; Conn. Const. art. I,
§ 15; Del. Const. art. I, § 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 8; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, P VIII; Idaho
Const. art. I, § 11; Ill. Const. art. I, § 22; Ind. Const. art. I, § 32; Kan. Const. B. of R., § 4;
Ky. Const. § 1; La. Const. art. I, § 11; Me. Const. art. I, § 16; Mich. Const. art. I, § 6; Miss.
Const. art. III, § 12; Mo. Const. art. I, § 23; Mont. Const. art. II, § 12; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1;
Nev. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. Const. art. II, § 6; N.D. Const. art.
I, § 1; Ohio Const. art. I, § 4; Okla. Const. art. II, § 26; Or. Const. art. I, § 27; Pa. Const. art.
I, § 21; R.I. Const. art. I, § 22; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 24; Tex. Const. art. I, § 23; Utah Const.
art. I, § 6; Vt. Const. ch. 1, art. XVI; Wash. Const. art. I, § 24; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22;
Wis. Const. art. I, § 25; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 24).
160. Id. at 920-21 (listing Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kansas as states with amendments similar to the
Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
161. Id. at 920, 925 (referring to the constitutions of California, Iowa, Maryland, Minne-
sota, and New Jersey, but noting the Minnesota Constitution states "[hiunting and fishing
and the taking of game and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever
preserved for the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good."
Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 12.). New York provides a statutory provision stating "a well reg-
ulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms cannot be infringed." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 4 (McKinney 1992).
162. Creamer, supra n. 158, at 921-25.
163. Alaska Const. art. I, § 19; Del. Const. art. I, § 20; Fla. Const. art. I, § 8; Idaho Const.
art. I, § 11; Me. Const. art. I, § 16; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1; Nev. Const. art. I, § 11; N.H.
Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. Const. art. II, § 6; N.D. Const. art. I, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. III,
§ 22; Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.
164. Alaska Const. art. I, § 19.
165. Del. Const. art. I, § 20.
166. Me. Const. art. I, § 16.
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the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting
and recreational use."167 This recent trend accentuates what is
otherwise obvious: states protect an individual right to keep and
bear arms.
A common thread in forty-four state constitutions is evidence
of a national consensus. The ubiquity of "concealed carry" laws
erases any doubt. The lucidity of states' constitutional provisions
regarding firearm rights has enabled them to expand such rights
by enacting concealed carry permit laws. As their namesake sug-
gests, these laws allow individuals to carry loaded firearms, sub-
ject to various qualifications. 168 A recent phenomenon, these laws
have grown exponentially in the last twenty years. Eight states
had right to carry laws in 1985.169 Florida's passage of a con-
cealed carry statute in 1987 opened the floodgates, as a deluge of
states enacted similar provisions. 170 In 2007, forty-eight states
had some form of concealed carry. 171 Of those forty-eight states,
thirty-nine have laws mandating that officials may not arbitrarily
deny a concealed carry application. 172 This system is described as
"shall issue."' 73 The other nine states have "may issue" processes
in which licenses are granted only upon the showing of a compel-
ling need.' 74 Only two states, Wisconsin and Illinois, along with
the District of Columbia, do not provide any concealed carry privi-
leges.1 75
Given this landscape, it is no surprise that gun control refer-
endums fail. In 1976, the people of Massachusetts voted against a
measure that would ban handguns by a margin of more than two
167. W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22.
168. David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms Laws: Effects on Homicide in
Three States, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 193, 194-95 (1995).
169. John R. Lott, Jr., The Bias against Guns: Why Almost Everything You've Heard
about Gun Control Is Wrong 73 (Regnery Publg. 2003). States with concealed carry permits
include Georgia, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont,
and Washington. Id.
170. Steven W. Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy? 29 Hamline L. Rev. 638, 646-47 (2006).
171. National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Issues, Fact Sheets, The
Stearns/Boucher Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Bill, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/
Read.aspx?id=189 (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter NRA-ILA Right-to-Carry Fact Sheet].
172. McDowall, supra n. 168, at 193.
173. NRA-ILA Right-to-Carry Fact Sheet, supra n. 171.
174. Id.; McDowall, supra n. 168, at 193.
175. National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Issues, Fact Sheets, H.R.
2088, the Veterans' Heritage Firearms Act, http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/
Read.aspx?id=198&issue=003 (May 10, 2006).
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to one. 176 Californians defeated a handgun ban initiative by sixty
percent in 1982.177 An Illinois town turned down a proposal to
ban handguns in 1985.178 Wisconsin, while being one of only
three jurisdictions that does not maintain some form of concealed
carry, has expressed its pro-gun right sentiments in a series of
proposals. Voters in Madison, Wisconsin rejected a non-binding
handgun ban referendum in 1993 by fifty-one percent. 179 In 1994,
Milwaukee voters rejected a binding handgun ban proposal by
sixty-seven percent, and Kenosha voters defeated a similar initia-
tive by seventy-three percent.' 80 These votes culminated in a
1998 statewide referendum in which Wisconsin voters approved,
by a three-to-one margin, an amendment to their state constitu-
tion protecting the right to arms "for security, defense, hunting,
recreation or any other lawful purpose."1'8 One exception to this
trend is San Francisco, whose voters approved a ban on handgun
possession in 2005. However, a court later struck the ban down
because state law preempted the ordinance.' 8 2 While sporadic,
these votes are consistent in their outcomes. They illustrate yet
another manifestation of the people's belief in an individual right
to possess firearms.
The confluence of state constitutions, concealed carry laws,
and gun referendums highlights the anomalous position of the
District of Columbia. The District's ordinance is the most intru-
sive gun restriction in the nation. However, the District's position
is not entirely isolated. In 1982, the City of Chicago enacted an
ordinance that amounted to a freeze on handgun ownership. All
firearms must be registered with the city;' 8 3 however, Chicago
176. Gary Kleck, Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America 363 (Aldine De Gruyter
1991).
177. Peter Hart & Doug Bailey, Gun Control: What Went Wrong in California, 41 Wall
St. J. 34 (Mar. 1, 1983).
178. Laurent Belsie, Chicago Suburb Sticks to its Guns, 77 Christian Sci. Monitor 3
(Apr. 4, 1985). The measure failed by a margin of more than 60 to 40%. Id.
179. Joel Broadway, Gun Ban Proposal Defeated, 97 Wis. St. J. 1A (Apr. 7, 1993).
180. Christopher R. McFadden, The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and the Case
against an Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed Weapons, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 709,
714 n. 26 (1999).
181. Id. at 709; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.
182. Bob Egelko, Judge Invalidates Prop. H Handgun Ban: Ruling Says Measure In-
trudes on an Area Regulated by State, S.F. Chron. (June 13, 2006).
183. Chicago Mun. Code § 8-20-040. The statute reads: "Registration of firearms. (a) All
firearms in the city of Chicago shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. It shall be the duty of a person owning or possessing a firearm to cause such
firearm to be registered." Id.
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does not issue registration certificates for handguns.18 4 San Fran-
cisco recently passed an ordinance mandating that all guns have a
trigger lock or be stored in a locked container. 8 5 That the na-
tional consensus is not one-sided is further underscored by the
amicus brief filed in Parker v. District of Columbia. The States of
Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey, along with the Cities
of Chicago, Boston, and New York, supported the District of Co-
lumbia in its defense of the firearm ordinance.
B. How National Consensus Influences the Supreme Court
While exceptions to the movement favoring individual fire-
arm rights exist, the Supreme Court cannot ignore the realities
that gun restrictions are viewed skeptically. Thirty-six state con-
stitutions provide for an individual right to keep and bear arms,
and forty-eight states embrace concealed carry. These facts must
be kept at the forefront as the following cases are discussed.
1. National Consensus and Homosexual Rights
Bowers v. Hardwick involved the constitutionality of a Geor-
gia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy.' 8 6 Bowers is illumi-
nating for its consideration of state trends.18 7 The importance of
how states viewed this conduct was encapsulated in the Court's
framing of the issue. The Court described the question presented
as whether the Constitution "confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws
of the many States that still make such conduct illegal.' 88
184. Id. at 8-20-050. The statute reads:
Unregisterable firearms.
No registration certificate shall be issued for any of the following types of firearms:
(a) Sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, or short-barreled rifle;
(b) Firearms, other than handguns, owned or possessed by any person in the city of
Chicago prior to the effective date of this chapter which are not validly registered
prior to the effective date of this chapter;
(c) Handguns, except:
(1) Those validly registered to a current owner in the city of Chicago prior to the
effective date of this chapter ....
Id.
185. Associated Press, San Francisco Passes Gun Law, N. Co. Times, http://www.nc-
times.com/articles/2007/08/03/news/state/1700 328_2_07.txt (Aug. 2, 2007).
186. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
187. Id. at 192-94.
188. Id. at 190.
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The Bowers Court engaged in a brief Constitutional analysis
before delving into the historical and contemporary prohibitions
against sodomy. Highlighting that every state outlawed sodomy
until 1961, the Court tallied the current figures, noting twenty-
four states plus the District of Columbia criminalized sodomy.
18 9
In light of these statistics, the Court delivered its coup de grace:
"Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious." 190
Disputing Hardwick's claim that morality was an improper basis
for the law, the Court concluded it was "unpersuaded that the sod-
omy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis."191
In the intervening years, those twenty-five states would dwin-
dle to thirteen, leading the Court to lay Bowers to rest in the 2003
decision, Lawrence v. Texas.1 92 Lawrence concerned a challenge to
a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. The Court
overruled Bowers in concluding the petitioners could engage in
private conduct under the protection of the Due Process Clause.1
93
Like Bowers, the Lawrence Court reviewed the history of sodomy
laws, but reached a different conclusion: "Over the course of the
last decades, States with same-sex prohibitions have moved to-
wards abolishing them.1 94 In light of this inclination, the Court
declared "that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here."195 A survey of state laws post-Bowers re-
vealed that of the thirteen remaining states which criminalized
sodomy, only four singled out the homosexual variety.196 The con-
sensus in favor of decriminalizing homosexual sodomy formed the
mainstay of the Lawrence Court's analysis, reasoning, and hold-
ing.
2. National Consensus and the Death Penalty
State trends have been at the forefront of every major Su-
preme Court capital punishment case of the last thirty years. In
1976, the seminal case of Gregg v. Georgia marked the return of
189. Id. at 193-94.
190. Id. at 194.
191. Id. at 196.
192. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
193. Id. at 578.
194. Id. at 570.
195. Id. at 571-72.
196. Id. at 573.
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the death penalty after the Supreme Court halted the punishment
four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia.197 The Gregg Court held
capital punishment did not run afoul of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments. 198 The Court considered the contemporary values
on the subject, using "objective indicia that reflect the public atti-
tude toward a given sanction."199 Developments after Furman es-
tablished "that a large population of American society continues to
regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary
criminal sanction. '200 Thirty-five states enacted new statutes pro-
viding for the death penalty.20 1 Citing a referendum and jury ver-
dicts as additional support, the Court concluded capital punish-
ment did not offend the evolving standards of decency. 20 2
A year after Gregg, the Court held capital punishment for the
rape of an adult woman was excessive in Coker v. Georgia.20 3 The
Coker Court noted that "[at] no time in the last 50 years have a
majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for
rape."20 4 The Court seized on the sea change following Furman v.
Georgia. Pre-Furman, sixteen states permitted capital punish-
ment for rapists.20 5 Post-Furman, only three states provided such
a penalty. 20 6 Additional court challenges whittled the three down
to a lone jurisdiction, Georgia. 20 7 The Coker Court stated that the
trend of the states "obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman."20  Finding an Eighth Amendment violation, the
Court concluded "the legislative rejection of capital punishment
for rape strongly confirms our judgment" that the death penalty
was disproportionate. 20 9
Enmund v. Florida applied the principles of Coker, and held
the death penalty unconstitutional for accomplices to murder.210
State developments took center stage again. Eight states allowed
197. Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
198. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
199. Id. at 173.
200. Id. at 179.
201. Id. at 179-80.
202. Id. at 181.
203. Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
204. Id. at 593.
205. Id. at 594.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 595-96.
208. Id. at 596.
209. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
210. Enmund v. Fla., 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
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the death penalty for a participant in a crime during which a mur-
der occurred. 211 The Court held "[s]ociety's rejection of the death
penalty for accomplice liability in felony murder" was manifested
in the paltry number of jurisdictions imposing the punishment.212
Like Coker, the Enmund Court used state trends to hold the death
penalty in certain circumstances contravened the Eighth Amend-
ment.21 3
As Coker and Enmund illustrate, national consensus is a
prevalent factor in testing the boundaries of what crimes impli-
cate capital punishment. The Court also used it in evaluating the
age limitations of capital offenders. Stanford v. Kentucky consid-
ered whether the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-
old offenders violated the Eighth Amendment.214 The Stanford
Court observed that twenty-five states provided the death penalty
for seventeen-year-old offenders and twenty-two states permitted
capital punishment for sixteen-year-old offenders. 215 The Court
commented that such a scenario did not "establish the degree of
national consensus" to render a punishment cruel and unusual.
21 6
The petitioners pointed to a federal statute limiting capital pun-
ishment to offenders age eighteen and older.21 7 The Court de-
ferred, reasoning that even a blanket federal prohibition on exe-
cuting offenders under eighteen would not establish "a national
consensus that such punishment is inhumane" given the "sub-
stantial number of state statutes to the contrary."218 The Court
discerned "neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus"
against capital punishment for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old of-
fenders. 219
State developments would sound the death knell for Stanford.
In the 2005 decision of Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held
the death penalty for an individual under eighteen when commit-
ting the offense violated the Eighth Amendment.220 Examining
the states' legislation, the Roper Court determined that the na-
tional consensus opposing the death penalty for juveniles sup-
211. Id. at 789.
212. Id. at 794.
213. Id. at 797.
214. Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
215. Id. at 370.
216. Id. at 371.
217. Id. at 372.
218. Id. at 373.
219. Id. at 380.
220. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
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ported striking down the law. 221 Thirty states prohibited the
death penalty for juveniles. 222 Those states without a formal pro-
hibition on executing juveniles engaged in the practice sporadi-
cally: "In the past 10 years, only three have done S0."22 3 The
Court enumerated the reasons for its holding as "the rejection of
the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infre-
quency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the con-
sistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice."224
State trends compelled the Court to again reverse course. In
the 1989 case Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held executing a men-
tally retarded individual was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment.225 But by 2002, state trends had eroded the underpinnings
of Penry. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled such executions
infringed upon the Eighth Amendment. 226 The Court noted soci-
ety's attention to the issue and stated "the consensus reflected in
those deliberations informs our answer."227 The dispositive factor
was the reaction to Penry. Sixteen states passed laws against exe-
cuting mentally retarded individuals. 228 The Court emphasized
"the consistency of the direction of change" in favor of prohibiting
these executions. 229 Citing other manifestations of this move-
ment, the Court determined the "consensus unquestionably re-
flects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of men-
tally retarded offenders."230 Finding the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited such punishments, the Court concluded it had "no reason
to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that have re-
cently addressed the matter. '231
The aforementioned cases attest that Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence is driven by state developments. Moreover, this fac-
tor is important enough to persuade the Court to reverse itself in
exceedingly short time frames. While the "evolving standards of
decency" test lends itself to gauging national consensus, the next
221. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332
(1989))).
222. Id. at 564.
223. Id. at 565.
224. Id. at 567.
225. Penry, 492 U.S. at 303.
226. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
227. Id. at 307.
228. Id. at 314-15.
229. Id. at 315.
230. Id. at 317.
231. Id. at 321 (internal quotations omitted).
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section shows another context in which the Court examines state
trends.
3. National Consensus and Euthanasia
The fountainhead of right-to-die jurisprudence, Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Dept. of Health considered whether a Missouri
law requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's
wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 232 In phrasing the issue, the Court noted, "the ma-
jority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penal-
ties on one who assists another to commit suicide."233 The Court
would return to this theme. Scrutinizing the Missouri require-
ments, the Court stated "[ilt is also worth noting that most, if not
all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining
the wishes of parties .... ",234 With national consensus in tow, the
Court concluded the Constitution did not prevent a State from us-
ing a clear and convincing standard to determine an incompetent
person's wishes to withdraw life saving treatment.235
The Court would revisit Cruzan in Washington v. Glucksberg,
which addressed whether Washington State's prohibition of as-
sisted suicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 236 The Court
highlighted the near-universal ban on assisted suicide: "In almost
every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a
crime to assist a suicide."237 The Court also noted the near-unani-
mous rejection of assisted suicide referendums. 238 While legisla-
tures had introduced bills legalizing assisted suicide, none had
passed.239 To the contrary, states were enacting more explicit
prohibitions of the practice.240 These realities prompted the Court
to conclude "voters and legislators continue for the most part to
reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide. 24 1
Through this prism, the Court contemplated the constitutional
challenge. The state trend against assisted suicide permeated the
Court's analysis. "To hold for respondents, we would have to re-
232. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990).
233. Id. at 280.
234. Id. at 284.
235. Id. at 292.
236. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
237. Id. at 710.
238. Id. at 717.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 718.
241. Id. at 716.
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verse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the
considered policy choice of almost every State."242 This concern,
coupled with Cruzan, formed the basis of the Court's holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the right to assisted
suicide.243 The Court's approach to this uncharted area was strik-
ingly similar to its consideration of abortion.
4. National Consensus and Abortion
Abortion was another issue of first impression in which the
Court drew upon state developments. Roe v. Wade exemplifies the
invocation of state trends. 244 Roe and its companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, involved challenges to a series of Texas and Georgia laws
prohibiting abortion. 245 The opening paragraph of Roe captured
the Court's sensitivity to legislative trends, where it enunciated
that "[t]he Georgia statutes.., have a modern cast and are a leg-
islative product that ... reflects the influences of recent attitudi-
nal change. .. "246 The Court embarked on an extensive histori-
cal discourse of abortion. Most States banned abortion through
the early 1960s. 24 7 At that juncture, the pendulum began to shift,
as "a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes... resulted
in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws
"248
After considering the States' treatment of the practice, the
Court contemplated the views of the medical and legal profes-
sions. The Court observed the American Medical Association's
shift in favor of abortion was sparked by "rapid changes in state
laws" and a belief "that this trend will continue."249 The American
Bar Association experienced a similar epiphany in 1972, approv-
ing the Uniform Abortion Act.250 The Roe opinion included the
Act in full, along with the Act's Prefatory Note, which the Court
described as "enlightening. '251 That the Court used this adjective
is telling, given the opening sentence of the Note: "This Act is
based largely upon the New York abortion act following a review
242. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
243. Id. at 728.
244. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
245. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
246. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
247. Id. at 139.
248. Id. at 140.
249. Id. at 143 (internal quotations omitted).
250. Id. at 146.
251. Id. at 147.
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of the more recent laws on abortion in several states and upon
recognition of a more liberal trend in laws on this subject. '252
With the evolving national consensus at the forefront, the Court
held that abortion fell within the parameters of personal liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This article argues the Court should be consistent in consider-
ing national consensus. However, it would be disingenuous to ig-
nore the Court's own inconsistency in contemplating this question.
Stenberg v. Carhart proves this point.253 In Stenberg, the Court
entertained a constitutional challenge to a Nebraska law which
criminalized the procedure of partial birth abortion.254 The Court
ruled the law infringed upon due process protections. 25 5 The ma-
jority recognized the widespread disapproval of the procedure, but
never quantified it. It was left to the dissent to raise the issue of
where the states lie.
Justice Scalia derided the ruling as "a 5-to-4 vote on a policy
matter by unelected lawyers [overcoming] the judgment of 30
state legislatures."256  Justice Kennedy bemoaned Stenberg's
treatment of abortion precedent of which a central premise "was
that the States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating
on the subject of abortion."257 Justice Kennedy chastised the ma-
jority for substituting its own "judgment for the judgment of Ne-
braska and some 30 other States .... ",258 Justice Thomas ended
his dissent lamenting that "today we are told that 30 states are
prohibited from banning one rarely used form of abortion that
they believe to border on infanticide."259 Stenberg notwithstand-
ing, the wellspring of abortion jurisprudence was created on the
foundation of national consensus.
252. Roe, 410 U.S. at 147 n. 41.
253. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
254. Id. at 921.
255. Id. at 945-46.
256. Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 979.
259. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court would reverse itself
7 years later when it upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Act in Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). As the matter did not involve a state law, the Court downplayed the
impact of state trends, although it did acknowledge the 30 states that had banned the
procedure when Stenberg was decided. Id. at 1623.
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5. National Consensus and the Fourth Amendment
Legislative developments have influenced the Court in its de-
termination of whether an arrest comports with the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 260 In U.S. v. Watson, the Court held an arrest executed
without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 261
Under the common law, officers could make an arrest without a
warrant for an offense committed in their presence. 262 The Court
noted "[tihis has also been the prevailing rule under state consti-
tutions and statutes."263 Noting almost every State granted statu-
tory authorization for such arrests, the Court was hesitant to im-
plement its "judicial preference" for securing a warrant before
making an arrest.264 Because "the judgment of the Nation and
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public ar-
rests on probable cause," the Court found the underlying arrest
did not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. 265
Payton v. New York involved a challenge to a series of New
York statutes allowing police officers to enter a home without a
warrant to make a routine felony arrest.266 The Court held the
Fourth Amendment prohibited such entries. 267 Acknowledging
the common law did not unequivocally establish precedent on the
issue, the Court considered the consensus of the states.268
Twenty-four state legislatures provided for warrantless entries
and fifteen proscribed them.269 The Court noted that "although
the weight of state-law authority is clear, there is by no means the
kind of virtual unanimity on this question that was present in
United States v. Watson."270 Citing the "obvious declining trend"
reflected in recent state court decisions, the Court concluded na-
260. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id.
261. U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
262. Id. at 418.
263. Id. at 419.
264. Id. at 421-23.
265. Id. at 423.
266. Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 597-98.
269. Id. at 598-99.
270. Id. at 600.
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tional consensus did not favor warrantless arrests.27 1 While na-
tional consensus did not deliver the sockdolager it did in other
contexts, it nevertheless persuaded the Court to find warrantless
entries ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
A final example is Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which consid-
ered the constitutionality of warrantless arrests for minor crimi-
nal offenses. 272 The petitioners argued the Fourth Amendment
limited police officers' misdemeanor arrest authority.2 7 3 The
Court held the history of the Fourth Amendment and modern de-
velopments rejected such a notion.274 The Court noted petitioners'
argument had never "become 'woven... into the fabric' of Ameri-
can law."275 Instead, the Court found "two centuries of uninter-
rupted (and largely unchallenged) state and federal practice per-
mitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to
or involving breach of the peace."276 The contemporary scene was
no different as "today statutes in all 50 States and the District of
Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by at least
some (if not all) peace officers. '277 For effect, the Court attached
an appendix to its opinion listing the fifty-one statutes authoriz-
ing warrantless arrests for minor offenses.
6. National Consensus and Free Speech
First Amendment cases have also been scrutinized through
the purview of state developments. While there is a paucity of in-
stances in which national consensus has been debated, the meth-
odology has been invoked to determine the scope of the First
Amendment. Burson v. Freeman involved a free speech challenge
to a Tennessee law prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the
distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance
to a polling place.2 78 The respondent argued the statute limited
her ability to communicate with voters.279 The Court examined
the origins of such restrictions and noted their popularity, as
every state limited access to polling places. 280 The Court found
271. Id.
272. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
273. Id. at 336.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 340 (internal quotations omitted).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 344.
278. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193 (1992).
279. Id. at 194.
280. Id. at 206.
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"this widespread and time-tested consensus demonstrates that
some restricted zone is necessary in order to serve the States' com-
pelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and election
fraud."28 ' Reiterating the importance of the well-established
movement favoring speech limitations, the Court concluded that a
"long history" and "substantial consensus" support the rationale of
protecting the fundamental right to vote. 28 2
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court struck
down a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct as incompatible with
the First Amendment. 28 3 Only four states had similar speech re-
strictions, prompting the Court to observe "[tihis practice, rela-
tively new to judicial elections and still not universally adopted,
does not compare well with the traditions deemed worthy of our
attention in prior cases."28 4 The Court has devoted more attention
to national consensus in other contexts. However, these two deci-
sions established precedent for applying state trends to the First
Amendment.
These excerpts demonstrate the substantial weight afforded
to national consensus. The multitude of cases invoking national
consensus reveals this is not an anomalous approach or limited to
certain contexts. While this methodology is prosaic, it does ensure
the Court's interpretation is within the realm of societal norms.
The Court's consideration of state trends in various areas of con-
stitutional jurisprudence acknowledges this fact. Whether this
factor could be applied to the Second Amendment is the focus of
the following section.
C. Applying National Consensus to the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms
The parties' briefs filed in Parker did not address the national
consensus on the right to keep and bear arms. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals was also silent. However, the preceding sections
establish the plethora of instances in which the Supreme Court
used state trends as a lodestar. There is ample precedent to apply
national consensus in a Second Amendment case. Issues tangled
in the intricate web of social, moral, and cultural values are the
most common terrain for the invocation of national trends. Like
281. Id.
282. Id. at 211.
283. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
284. Id. at 786.
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abortion, sodomy, and the death penalty, gun rights represent the
perfect storm of legal and social complexities. The Court's ex-
tended hiatus from the Second Amendment is further justification
to take into account the states' approach to the right to keep and
bear arms.
The underlying right asserted in Parker is enshrined in a fed-
eral amendment. While a collective right reading from the Court
would leave the firearm provisions of the individual states intact,
a meaningless Second Amendment would be an anomaly given the
national consensus. It would further contrast with the forty-eight
states that elevate individual firearm rights by dint of concealed
carry permits. Additionally, a meaningful Second Amendment
would protect citizens in states with weak commitments to gun
rights.
Colonial and early state enactments addressing the right to
keep and bear arms have been dredged up, pored over, and ex-
pounded upon. These analyses are a valuable aid in parsing the
Second Amendment. But in the haste to divine the thought
processes of state legislators in the 1770s, commentators and
courts have disregarded the actions of state legislators in the
1970s. State constitutions, many ratified or amended in more re-
cent times, are relegated to a footnote. Concealed carry laws are
ignored. Debating the meaning of amorphous, opaque, and centu-
ries-old writing ensures a livelier dialogue than simply noting the
obvious. Mundane or not, the national consensus of the last thirty
years cannot be cast out of the Second Amendment debate. This is
not to suggest the evidence distilled from the colonial era is out-
dated, unimportant, or of lesser worth. However, recent state
laws represent a clear, consistent, and modern approach to the
right to keep and bear arms. Limiting the analysis to state enact-
ments from the late eighteenth century is akin to looking in the
rear view mirror to see the road ahead.
Many state constitutions eschew the militia aspect, or include
it alongside the right to defend oneself as justifications for the
right to keep arms. With the benefit of hindsight, states articu-
lated firearm rights more clearly.28 5 While the transparency with
which state constitutions address the right to keep and bear arms
is significant, there are additional manifestations of the states'
amenable atmosphere to gun rights. Forty-eight states have some
285. Robert A. Creamer, History Is Not Enough: Using Contemporary Justifications for
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Interpreting the Second Amendment, 45 B.C. L. Rev.
905 (2004).
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form of concealed carry. Forty states follow a "shall-issue" frame-
work. Concealed carry laws are an accurate barometer of the na-
tional consensus towards firearms. Such laws are impervious to
the biases of commentators and are undeniable in their message.
Trusting a citizen with the right to carry a firearm in public is the
ultimate embodiment of an individual right to keep and bear
arms. Yet, the vast majority of jurisdictions permit concealed
carry. Such a policy is the polar opposite of the District of Colum-
bia ordinance. Thus, the District's gun ordinance is an aberration
when considering the national consensus.
The thrust of this argument is not that the Court should use
opinion polls or the majority view to guide its decision making.
The raison d'etre of the judiciary is its counter-majoritarian attrib-
utes. However, various questions of constitutional nature lend
themselves to examining the evolving nature of society and deter-
mining where on that spectrum the current norm lies. National
consensus is not the determinative factor of a constitutional anal-
ysis, but one of many considerations. Whatever the merits of this
approach and whatever predominance national consensus is
given, it should be done consistently. Because the Court has used
state trends to gauge the scope of other constitutional protections,
the Court should implement it in a Second Amendment case. The
Court's longstanding silence on the right to keep and bear arms
further engenders such a consideration. Over the last seventy
years, states have experimented with licensing schemes, con-
cealed carry permits, and weapons bans. Their determination
that an individual right to keep and bear arms should be pro-
tected, embraced, and expanded, reflects the results of these inter-
actions.
Applying national consensus to the Second Amendment en-
sures the right to keep and bear arms will not be interpreted in a
time warp. It also maintains consistency. The Court has ac-
knowledged modern realities in other constitutional contexts.
Abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty have been viewed
through the lens of an evolving society, and the Court was im-
pacted by the direction in which states leaned. The States have
spoken with a single voice on the right to keep and bear arms.
This clarity is significantly more pronounced in comparison to
other issues. That the Court has been swayed by lesser consen-
suses reveals the import of the virtual unanimity on individual
firearm rights.
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V. INDIVIDUAL FIREARM RIGHTS IN THE FOREIGN REALM
As the preceding section attests, a Second Amendment inter-
pretation by the Court might examine factors beyond the individ-
ual-versus-collective paradigm. One such element is international
jurisprudence. The concept of constitutional comparativism en-
tails that international and foreign law should be used to inter-
pret the U.S. Constitution.2 6 Some Supreme Court justices have
developed a penchant for this theory. Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
berg stated "[wie are the losers if we do not both share our experi-
ence with, and learn from others."28 7 She admitted the Court
could improve "the dynamism with which we interpret our Consti-
tution" by considering foreign decisions. 288 Justice Stephen
Breyer has extolled the virtues of engaging in a more expansive
Constitutional review by engaging foreign views. 28 9 Justice
Anthony Kennedy noted foreign courts "have been somewhat con-
cerned ... that we [do] not cite their decisions with more regular-
ity. ' 290 This inclination has raised the ire of other justices. 291
Justice Scalia argued that the notion "American law should con-
form to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out
of hand."292 However, these objections have not prevented the
Court from considering the international opinion on the death
penalty, affirmative action, and homosexual rights. While the
Court's invocation of foreign law is not as widespread as its use of
national consensus, international influence cannot be underesti-
mated. The following section illustrates this point.
A. The Supreme Court's Use of Constitutional Comparativism
Homosexual rights have become a flashpoint in the constitu-
tional comparativism clash. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court in-
validated a Texas criminal law that prohibited homosexual sod-
286. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA
L. Rev. 639 (2005).
287. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 1 (2003).
288. Id. at 5.
289. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Intl. J.
Const. L. 519 (2005).
290. Jeffery Tobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, The New Yorker 22 (Sept. 12, 2005).
291. David Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist .
Sometimes, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1251 (2007).
292. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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omy.293 The Court considered whether the underlying statute
comported with the Constitution in relation to "values we share
with a wider civilization. ' 294 The Lawrence Court's critique of its
predecessor, Bowers v. Hardwick, stemmed from multiple con-
cerns. One source of consternation was Bowers' refusal to ac-
knowledge the international jurisprudence involving sodomy.
Five years before Bowers, the European Court of Human Rights
invalidated anti-sodomy laws under the European Convention on
Human Rights. 295 Unlike Bowers, the Lawrence Court professed
greater awareness of international dynamics, relying on an ami-
cus curiae brief of the United Nations that condemned anti-sod-
omy laws. 296 The Court remarked that "the reasoning and holding
in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere."297 In holding the Due
Process right of privacy extended to same-sex intimacies, the
Court was impacted by case law from the European Court of
Human Rights and other nations protecting the "right of homosex-
ual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct." 298 While
Lawrence marks the latest invocation of international law, prece-
dent for such an approach can be traced to Eighth Amendment
case law.
Death penalty decisions are ground zero for the constitutional
comparativism debate. Foreign influence on the "cruel and unu-
sual" determination in the modern era has its roots in Trop v. Dul-
les.299 Trop involved an Army deserter punished for his offense by
losing his U.S. citizenship.300 The Court ruled that such a penalty
was cruel and unusual.30 1 The Court noted the "virtual unanim-
ity" of countries that did not inflict statelessness as punish-
ment.30 2 A United Nations survey cited by the Court revealed
only two countries meted denationalization for desertion.30 3
293. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
294. Id. at 576.
295. Id. (citing Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 52 (1981)).
296. Id. at 576-77; Br. Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al., at 11-12, Lawrence v. Tex.,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
297. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
298. Id. (citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 52). The Court commented that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has issued additional opinions protecting the right of homo-
sexual adults to engage in consensual conduct. Id. (citing P.G. & J.H. v. U.K., App. No.
44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993);
Norris v. Ir., 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988)).
299. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
300. Id. at 88.
301. Id. at 103.
302. Id. at 102.
303. Id. at 103.
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The Supreme Court's 1988 decision of Thompson v. Oklahoma
marked the first death penalty case to consider foreign laws.30 4 In
Thompson, the Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment
forbade executing juveniles fifteen years old and younger.30 5 The
Court held such punishments were cruel and unusual. In reach-
ing this determination, the Court noted the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and the Soviet Union excluded minors from capital pun-
ishment.30 6 The Court found further support from "three major
human rights treaties explicitly prohibit[ing] juvenile death pen-
alties."30 7 In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled executing men-
tally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment. 308 Cit-
ing an amicus brief authored by the European Union, the Court
highlighted that "within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded of-
fenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."30 9 While the Court did
not spend significant time on foreign laws in Thompson and At-
kins, its raising the subject was groundbreaking.
Finally, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court used foreign guid-
ance to determine the Eighth Amendment forbade the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Boding ill for the Sec-
ond Amendment, the Roper Court's holding that the death penalty
for juvenile offenders was unconstitutional found "confirmation in
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the
world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty."310 The Court cited the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which prohibits capital punishment for
crimes committed by individuals under eighteen.311 The Court
further relied on England's abolishment of executing any person
under eighteen at the time of the offense, in effect since 1948.312
Roper and its predecessors establish constitutional comparativism
has become an integral part of the Eighth Amendment equation.
304. Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
305. Id. at 817.
306. Id. at 830-31.
307. Id. at 831, n. 34.
308. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For an analysis of the role of international law
in persuasive amicus filings, see Gordon R. Jimison, Amicus Filings and International Law:
Toward a Global View of the United States Constitution, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 267 (2005).
309. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n. 21.
310. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
311. Id. (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a) (entered into force Sept.
2, 1990) GA Res. 44/25, UN CRC/C, 44th Sess. (available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/k2crc.htm)).
312. Id. at 577-78.
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Affirmative action is another issue in which the Court solic-
ited international views. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court held
that student body diversity in law school education constituted a
compelling state interest. 313 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg
noted the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination endorses "measures to ensure the
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups...
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 314 Justice Ginsberg
also cited the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women for support.31 5 While the interna-
tional consensus did not command the majority's attention, it is
revealing that such considerations impacted at least one justice.
The final case that bears mentioning is Printz v. U.S.316
While foreign guidance had a peripheral role in the adjudication,
its context is noteworthy. Printz concerned a challenge to the
Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act ("Brady Act"). However,
gun control and the Second Amendment played bit parts while
federalism took center stage. The Printz Court held unconstitu-
tional provisions of the Brady Act requiring local officials to accept
Brady Act forms and perform background checks on handgun ap-
plicants. 317 The Court reasoned that state legislatures were not
subject to federal direction.318
Constitutional comparativism reared its head in an exchange
between the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer and the Printz
majority. Justice Breyer concurred with Justice Stevens' dissent
that Congress had the ability to pass whatever laws are necessary
and proper to carry out its enumerated powers. 319 But Justice
Breyer further argued that foreign governments could shed light
on the question of federalism. Referencing the federal systems of
Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, Justice Breyer
remarked, "all provide that constituent states, not federal bureau-
cracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regu-
lations, or decrees enacted by the central 'federal' body. ' 320 To bol-
313. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
314. Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Annex to GA Res. 2106, UN GAOR,
20th Sess., Res. Supp. 14, art. 2(2), 47, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965)).
315. Id.
316. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
317. Id. at 923-24, 933, 935.
318. Id. at 923-24.
319. Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ster his assertion, Justice Breyer cited authorities arguing the Eu-
ropean paradigm facilitated less interference with local
authority. 321
Justice Breyer's theory drew a sharp retort from the majority.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, "[w]e think such
comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution .... *"322 The majority further added, "[tihe fact is
that our federalism is not Europe's. ''323 While Printz devoted only
a few paragraphs to international dynamics, its presence in a fed-
eralism opinion speaks volumes.
The sporadic use of constitutional comparativism can be
traced to the nascent nature of this methodology. The frequency
in which international views are solicited will increase, as this
movement is in its ascendancy. The Second Amendment may be-
come implicated in this trend. Admittedly, the Second Amend-
ment is sui generis, making comparison with other countries inex-
act.324 Few nations have laws resembling the Second Amend-
ment. Firearms have a unique significance in American law and
culture, posing a problem for those seeking to rely on interna-
tional views. Nonetheless, the Court's use of foreign law as an aid
in interpreting the Constitution could surface in a Second Amend-
ment decision. The following sections explore this scenario.
B. The International Community's Condemnation of Individual
Firearm Rights
Current world opinion favors prohibiting individual access to
firearms. Such views are severe enough to abrogate the Second
Amendment. A manifestation of this view is the increasing inter-
est of international bodies in controlling firearms. As one com-
mentator notes, "[left unchecked, international gun control will
321. Id. at 976-77.
322. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n. 11 (majority).
323. Id.
324. Even comparing murder rates between the U.S. and other countries results in
skewed findings. The most instructive comparisons with U.S. crime rates would use Aus-
tralia or Great Britain, both of which instituted strict gun laws in recent years. As John
Lott explains, in 1996 Britain banned handguns, and by 2000 gun crimes had risen 40%.
Lott, Jr., supra n. 169, at 77. The UK leads the U.S. by an almost 2-to-1 margin in violent
crime. Id. "The English and American peoples still share notions of England as the peace-
able kingdom, of America as the violent republic. But the truth of this particular compari-
son matters deeply because of its policy implications. The Anglo-American contrast is cited
repeatedly as proof that more guns means more crime." Joyce Lee Malcolm, Guns and
Violence: The English Experience 218-19 (Harv. U. Press 2002).
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compromise a fundamental human right as viewed by U.S. citi-
zens." 325 The United Nations began focusing on restricting fire-
arms after passing a resolution in 1995.326 A product of that reso-
lution was a 1997 report which devised "methods to control and
eliminate such accumulations and transfers of small arms and
light weapons."327 The U.N.'s efforts intensified in 2001 after it
held a Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects. 328 The conference defined "small
arms" as, inter alia, "revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles, sub-
machine guns, assault rifles."329 The second Biennial Meeting of
States to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms was held in July 2005. The intransigence of the United
States frustrated the U.N. Conference President, who decried, "I
must, as President, also express my disappointment over the Con-
ference's inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State, on
language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls
over private ownership of these deadly weapons .. "..",330 Ulti-
mately, the United States' obstinacy would not impede the U.N.'s
efforts.
In October of 2006, U.N. member states voted to create the
Arms Trade Treaty. 331 This agreement will regulate the sale and
325. Joseph Bruce Alonso, International Law and the United States Constitution in Con-
flict: A Case Study on the Second Amendment, 26 Hous. J. Intl. L. 1, 2 (2003) (explaining
the U.N.'s efforts toward international gun control and how those efforts conflict with the
American right to bear arms).
326. The U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 50/70 B on December 12, 1995, giv-
ing the Secretary-General a mandate "to report on the phenomenon of small arms." See
Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN A, 52d Sess., UN Doc. Al
52/298 (Aug. 27, 1997); Bobby L. Scott, The U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small
Arms and Light Weapons: An Exercise in Futility, 31 Ga. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 681,683 (2003)
(discussing in detail the germination of the U.N.'s involvement with firearms).
327. General and Complete Disarmament, GA Res. 50/70B, UN GAOR, 90th plen. mtg.,
UN Doc. A/RES/50/70 A-R (1996). The U.N. defines "small arms" as including revolvers,
rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns and assault rifles, and "light weapons" as light and
heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank and aircraft guns and mortars of cali-
bers less than 100mm. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, supra
n. 326.
328. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN A, 23, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15 (2001) (available at
http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/smallarms/files/aconf192-15.pdf) [hereinafter UN Re-
port].
329. Brochure of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN A, 56th year, UN Doc. DPI/2183 (2001) (available at
http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/smallarms/brochure.htm).
330. UN Report, supra n. 328, at 23; see 'also Bonanno, supra n. 134, at 463-64.
331. BBC News, UN Initiates Arms Trade Agreement (2006) (available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6088200.stm) (updated Oct. 27, 2006).
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transfer of guns. The resolution passed overwhelmingly, as 139
countries voted for the resolution, 24 abstained, and the lone op-
posing vote was the United States.332 The resolution charges the
U.N. to create "a comprehensive, legally-binding instrument es-
tablishing common standards for the import, export and transfer
of conventional arms."333 The treaty is currently being drafted,
and it is clear the end result will spawn additional showdowns
between the U.S. and the U.N.
The Second Amendment and international opinion are on a
collision course. The contrast between the United States and its
neighbors is embodied in their recurring disputes over firearm
regulations. The United States' persistence in clinging to the Sec-
ond Amendment has made it the bate noire of the international
community. It is unclear whether the United States' isolated posi-
tion will influence the Court's views. The Court would seemingly
have to diverge from its recent efforts coalescing around interna-
tional opinion if it read the Second Amendment broadly. Consid-
ering individual firearm rights through an international lens is a
complex endeavor. While current world opinion disfavors individ-
ual gun rights, there lies a deeper issue which the international
community and collective right adherents often ignore.
C. Disarmament: The Gateway to Tyranny
While the Second Amendment's meaning is one of constitu-
tional interpretation, it is difficult to examine any issue, let alone
the right to keep and bear arms, in a jurisprudential vacuum.
Lurking beneath the patina of Second Amendment vernacular are
policy considerations. Constitutional scholar Akhil Amar notes
that since an expansive reading of the Second Amendment "is a
policy choice rather than a clear constitutional command, we are
entitled to ask ourselves whether a given broad reading makes
good sense as a matter of principle and practice."334 Thus, the pol-
icy implications of an individual right reading are a critical com-
ponent of the Second Amendment question.
Given the attention on the Second Amendment, one would as-
sume analysts have scrutinized the entire policy spectrum. But
those advocating a narrow right to keep and bear arms have left a
332. Id.
333. U.N. General Assembly, International Arms Trade Treaty Aim of Draft Resolution,
Press Release (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gadis3335.doc.htm.
334. Amar, supra n. 13, at 895.
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significant weakness exposed in their haste to highlight the dele-
terious consequences of guns. This Achilles' heel concerns the
mayhem that ensues once individual firearm rights are curtailed.
Unarming a populace has been the hallmark of tyrannous re-
gimes. History shows a defenseless population is an integral in-
gredient to genocide. While firearm restrictions are not synony-
mous with disarmament, the slope between the two is slippery.
This in no way suggests collective right adherents seek disarma-
ment or approve of despotic regimes, but rather have not fully ad-
dressed their positions' consequences. Collective right and gun
control advocates' refusal to construe their positions in an histori-
cal light represents a significant failing. This neglect cannot be
excused, as numerous commentators have outlined the sordid con-
nection between disarmament and tyranny.335
Historians have deduced that in the twentieth century, 262
million deaths have been at the hands of governments. 336 One au-
thority explains: "It is as though our species has been devastated
by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of
Power, not germs."337 Anxiety about a centralized government en-
gaging in mass murder is not fanciful, but grounded in the harsh-
ness of history. While the background, impetus, and methodology
of these genocides vary, there remains one constant: disarma-
ment. Other factors that precipitate mass murder exist. How-
ever, it strains credulity to contend the link between disarmament
and tyranny is tenuous. Abolishing guns promotes a pliant popu-
lace. This premise is proven by history and based in common
sense, because "from the point of view of any aggressor, it is desir-
able if not essential that intended victims not possess weapons,
especially firearms."338
Those advocating a weak Second Amendment do not defend
tyrants. However, the society they seek is ripe for governmental
abuse. That those pining for a narrow Second Amendment ulti-
mately desire disarmament is not hyperbole. The following ex-
335. See e.g. R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (Transaction Publishers 1997); David
B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, Global Deaths from Firearms: Searching for
Plausible Estimates, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 113 (2004); Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi Firearms
Law and the Disarming of the German Jews, 17 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 483 (2000); Daniel
D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 1237
(1997).
336. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 1-28; see also R. J. Rummel, Freedom, Democide, War,
20th Century Democide, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM (accessed Nov. 8,
2007).
337. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 9.
338. Polsby & Kates, Jr., supra n. 335, at 1242.
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cerpts prove a meaningful Second Amendment is a necessary bul-
wark against disarmament advocates.
United States Senator Dianne Feinstein, commenting on an
assault weapons ban, stated "[ilf I could have gotten 51 votes in
the Senate of the United States for an outright ban, picking up
every one of them, Mr. and Mrs. America turn them all in, I would
have done it. ' '33 9 Former United States Senator Howard Metzen-
baum complained that the same ban was insufficient, exclaiming,
"until you ban them all, you might as well ban none .... [But, it]
will be a major step in achieving the objective that we have in
mind."340 United States Congressman William L. Clay pro-
claimed the 1993 Brady Bill was a "minimum step" that Congress
should take in its efforts to restrict firearms. Congressman Clay
professed, "[w]e need much stricter gun control, and eventually we
should bar the ownership of handguns except in a few cases."341 A
fellow member of the House of Representatives, Congressman
Bobby Rush, was also forthright in his strategy: "Ultimately, I
would like to see the manufacture and possession of handguns
banned except for military and police use. But that's the end-
game."342 Senator Lincoln Chafee was no less bashful when he
asserted, "I shortly will introduce legislation banning the sale,
manufacture or possession of handguns .... It is time to act. We
cannot go on like this. Ban them!"343 The recent tragedy at Vir-
ginia Tech prompted Congressman Dennis Kucinich to draft legis-
lation "that would ban the purchase, sale, transfer, or possession
of handguns by civilians."344 While such views have not garnered
a majority of lawmakers, these statements are notable for their
stridency and frankness.
The desire to ban firearms is not the exclusive province of fed-
eral officials. San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros and Baltimore
339. Chris Cox, 2nd Amendment: Mr. and Mrs. America, Turn Them All in, S.F. Chron.
D5 (Mar. 7, 2004).
340. 139 Cong. Rec. S15432 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993).
341. Robert L. Koenig, NRA-Backed Measure May Derail Brady Bill, St. Louis Post Dis-
patch 1A (May 8, 1991). See also Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42
Am. U. L. Rev. 53 (1992) (examining the invocation of the slippery slope argument in the
gun control debate).
342. Evan Osnos, Bobby Rush: Democrat, U.S. House of Representatives, Chi. Trib. C3
(Dec. 5, 1999) (quoting Rep. Bobby Rush).
343. Sen. John H. Chafee, In View of Handguns' Effects, There's Only One Answer: A
Ban, Minneapolis Star Trib. 13A (June 15, 1992).
344. Dennis J. Kucinich, Kucinich Offers Comprehensive Plan to Address Violence in
America, http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=62819 (ac-
cessed Jan. 31, 2008).
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Mayor Kurt Schmoke signed the Communitarian Network's The
Case for Domestic Disarmament, which provided: "There is little
sense in gun registration. What we need to significantly enhance
public safety is domestic disarmament .... Domestic disarma-
ment entails the removal of arms from private hands. '345 One gun
control adherent admitted, "[wie will never fully solve our nation's
horrific problem of gun violence unless we ban the manufacture
and sale of handguns and semiautomatic assault weapons."346
While not all collective right adherents espouse such views,
their reading of the Second Amendment could lead to such restric-
tions. Such policies are not without consequences. The events be-
low are examined with a singular focus on firearm laws. While
other factors played a role in these massacres, the following sec-
tions weave a mosaic of murder, linked by the common strand of
restricting firearm rights.
1. Turkey Disarms the Armenians
The dispute over Turkey's slaughter of Armenians during
World War I is well known. Turkey's refusal to acknowledge the
atrocities periodically sparks diplomatic rows with the United
States and European Union. Unfortunately, the events that led to
the carnage are often ignored. While the enmity between the
Turkish government and Armenians was multifaceted, the gov-
ernment's solution to resolving the dispute was simple. Turkey
first curtailed the firearm rights of Armenians, and then elimi-
nated all their rights.
Turkey had learned the consequences of oppressing an armed
populace. In 1894, Armenians had taken up arms and fought back
after state-sanctioned persecution. 347 After weeks of fighting, the
government promised the fighters pardons if they ceased fight-
ing.348 After acquiescing, the government slaughtered the entire
contingent. 349 This experience was a catalyst to strip Armenians
of their weapons.
In 1910, the Turkish government enacted a law banning the
manufacture and importation of weapons, the carrying of weap-
345. Amitai Etzioni & Steven Hellend, The Case for Domestic Disarmament, http:ll
www.gwu.edu/-ccps/pop disarm.html (accessed Nov. 8, 2007).
346. Jeff Muchnick, Better Yet, Ban All Handguns, USA Today llA (Dec. 29, 1993).
347. Edward Alexander, A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice 34
(Maxwell Macmillan Intl. 1991).
348. Id.
349. Id.
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ons, cartridges, and gunpowder.350 Five years later, as historian
R. J. Rummell explains, "under the guise of wartime necessity,
and to protect against possible sabotage and rebellion by Armeni-
ans, the government demanded that Armenians in all towns and
villages turn in their arms or face severe penalties."351 Armenian
troops serving under Turkish forces "were disarmed, demobilized,
and grouped into labor battalions. Concurrently, the Armenian
civilian population was also disarmed. .".."352 These assessments
are not slanted summations of revisionist scholars. The Turks
made their intentions known in black and white. An "official proc-
lamation" of the Ottoman Empire provided: "Armenians being
prohibited to carry any fire arms, they must surrender to the gov-
ernment all kinds of arms, pistols, bombs and daggers that they
have hidden in their houses or out of the doors." 35 3 Restricting
firearm rights was the entreaty to eliminating 1.5 million Armeni-
ans between 1915 and 1917.
The atrocities that followed were wicked not only in their sa-
dism but their expediency. The government murdered approxi-
mately seventy percent of the Armenians in a single year, sur-
passing Adolf Hitler, who killed about forty percent of the Jewish
population over five years. 354 The soldiers would "rape the girls
and murder the young men-all this in the presence of par-
ents. '355 Officials would compete to devise the cruelest torment,
the prize going to a man who devised the idea of "nailing horse-
shoes to the feet of his Armenian victims." 356 Such violence con-
tinued unabated as the Armenians had no way to fight back and
the international community was transfixed with World War I.
Turkey is the first instance of the twentieth century in which an
unarmed population was led to its slaughter. Sadly, it was not the
last.
350. The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code at 122-23.
351. Rummel, supra n. 335, at 217.
352. Robert F. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Geno-
cide and the Holocaust 143-44 (U. Chi. Press 1992).
353. Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman, & Alan M. Rice, Lethal Laws 91 (June 13, 1913).
354. Id. at 223.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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2. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany Repress Firearm
Rights
The Armenian massacre was replicated in the Soviet Union
and Nazi Germany, but to an exponential degree. The parallels
between the Soviet and Nazi regimes' repressive techniques are
striking. The Soviet Union began instituting firearm restrictions
in 1918 when Vladimir Lenin decreed that all citizens surrender
their firearms, ammunition, and sabers to the government. 357 A
few years later, the government made firearm possession punisha-
ble by hard labor. Soviet Decree exempted Communist Party
members from surrendering their arms: "The Military Commis-
sars are ordered not to take rifles and revolvers in the possession
of members of the Russian Communist Party .... ,358 By 1929,
firearm owners were personae non gratae.359 In tandem with
these firearm restrictions, Joseph Stalin instituted policies clamp-
ing down on other freedoms. For the next twenty-five years, more
than 20 million dissidents, unable to defend themselves, were
starved to death or rounded up and exterminated. 360
Across the Danube, Germany was engaging in its own atroci-
ties, facilitated by an unarmed Jewish population. Nazi Germany
represents the best known example of disarmament leading to ge-
nocide. As Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party solidified their grip on
power, the Nazis enacted the "Weapons Law" in March of 1938
which implemented gun control, barred Jewish people from busi-
nesses involving firearms, and exempted Nazi officials from any
firearm restrictions. 361 A few months later Germany enacted ad-
ditional gun control under the "Regulations Against Jews" Act.362
The new law unabashedly singled out Jews, proclaiming: "Jews
are prohibited from acquiring, possessing, and carrying firearms
and ammunition, as well as truncheons or stabbing weapons.
Those now possessing weapons and ammunition are at once to
turn them over to the local police authority."36 3 By 1939, the Nazi
regime had completely repressed the Jewish population and other
357. Aaron Zelman & Richard W. Stevens, Death by "Gun Control": The Human Cost of
Victim Disarmament (Mazel Freedom Press 2001).
358. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 125.
359. "Owning a pistol meant an obligatory conviction for terrorism .... " Aleksandr I.
Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 195 (Harper & Row 1974).
360. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment 484-87 (Oxford U. Press 1990).
361. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 156.
362. Id.
363. Simkin et al., supra n. 353, at 183.
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enemies of the state. 364 From 1939 to 1945, 10 million defenseless
people were rounded up and exterminated.
3. Current Atrocities Spawned by Disarmament
The aforementioned examples are not relics of a bygone era.
History repeats itself in Zimbabwe. Once "the breadbasket of Af-
rica," the country is now a human rights crisis. 365 Elected in 1980,
President Robert Mugabe has slowly perpetrated a systematic
raping of people and land. As Newsweek reports, "Mugabe's rule
is increasingly taking on the outlines of the worst dictator-
ships."366 Mugabe at first limited his violence to white farmers.
As author Amy Chua describes, "furious mobs wielding sticks,
axes, crossbows, iron bars, sharpened bicycle spokes, and AK-47
automatic rifles have invaded and ripped apart white-owned com-
mercial farms. Usually by the hundreds, sometimes a thousand at
a time, the invaders ... ransack and destroy ... beating, raping,
abducting."367 Chua notes the "assaults have not been spontane-
ous. Rather, they have been sponsored and encouraged by the
Zanu-PF government of President Robert Mugabe." 368
Mugabe's oppressive tactics eventually became colorblind.
Murder and torture have become the central planks of his domes-
tic policy.3 69 The country has descended into a police state, where
voicing opposition to Mugabe is akin to a death wish. The govern-
ment's ultimate goal is simple. Didymus Mutasa, Zimbabwe's
Minister of State, chillingly commented, "We would be better off
with only six million people, with our own people who support the
liberation struggle. We don't want all these extra people."37 °
Zimbabwe's population is twelve million.
Mugabe's crimes have proceeded with minimal encumbrance
thanks to their victims' defenseless state. President Mugabe did
364. Zelman, supra n. 357.
365. BBC, Weekly Economic Report, Zimbabwe; Grain Board Preparing to Restock Sup-
plies with South African Maize (Oct. 8, 1991); Steve Newman, Earthweek: A Diary of the
Planet, Atlanta J. & Const., El (Nov. 7, 1992) (available at http:ll
www.atlantamusicguide.com/atlantajournal-constitution.htm).
366. Scott Johnson, Digging a Grave for Zimbabwe, 149 n. 25 Newsweek 38 (June 18,
2007).
367. Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability 127-28 (Doubleday 2003).
368. Id.
369. Johnson, supra n. 366, at 38.
370. Kevin Engle & Gregory Stanton, Facing Mass Murder in Zimbabwe, http://
www.genocidewatch.org/ZimbabweFacingMassMurderl2August2005.htm (Aug. 12, 2005).
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not initiate the gun control laws of his country; he inherited them
from the British, descendants of whom ruled the country until
1980. The 1957 Rhodesian Firearms Act mandated that all fire-
arm purchases go through a licensed dealer in order to ensure a
government paper trail. "The records of all transactions-the
names of licensed gun owners, and details of the firearms they
own-go straight to the office of the president, Robert Mugabe."371
Mugabe took the firearm restrictions to a new level-abolishment.
In 2000, the government ordered the seizure of all white-owned
firearms. The Zimbabwe Information Minister confirmed that
"police had orders to scour all 4,000 white-owned farms for unli-
censed firearms ... [and] ammunition."372 Recognizing the bene-
fits of disarming those he sought to exploit, Mugabe ordered all
civilians to surrender their firearms in 2005.3 73 This measure was
followed by the government's "clean-up" campaign, which "left
close to a million people without shelter after their shanty homes
were demolished."374
Zimbabwe's economy has been in a downward spiral for years.
The ruinous economic consequences caused by the seizure of
white-owned farms represents a microcosm of Mugabe's financial
incompetence. Mugabe has ruled with complete disregard for fun-
damental economic realities, with predictable results. Mugabe
has instituted price controls on basic necessities such as food and
gasoline. 375 Such policies have sent prices skyrocketing. As the
economy headed due south, Mugabe fixed the exchange rate.376 In
the meantime, the government doled out money to allies of the
government and wasted funds on boondoggles.37 7 The sum total of
these policies was manifested in inflation rates of 7600%.378 Such
stratospheric inflation rates cannot be corralled because the gov-
371. Kopel et al., supra n. 335, at 413.
372. David Blair, Police Search Besieged Farms for Guns, Daily Telegraph 5, http:l!
www.zimbabwesituation.com/aprill9(2).html (Apr. 18, 2000).
373. ZWNews.com, Harare Compels Public to Surrender Their Guns, http://zwnews.com/
issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=12207 (June 30, 2005).
374. Id.
375. Robert Guest, The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption, and African Lives 34
(Smithsonian Books 2004).
376. Id. at 34-35.
377. Id. at 36-37.
378. Scott Baldauf, Why Africa Won't Rein in Mugabe, Christian Sci. Monitor (May 16,
2007) (available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0516/pOlsOl-woaf.htm); Macdonald
Dzirutwe & Nelson Banya, Zimbabwe Inflation Hits Record as Mugabe Tightens Grip,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2288696920070822 (Aug. 22, 2007).
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ernment has "failed to address the real cause: the regime's habit of
printing money to pay its bills. '379
The people of Zimbabwe endure these woes because their abil-
ity to effectuate change is negligible. Mugabe rigs elections and
inflicts lethal violence on opposition party supporters. During
election season, government-owned newspapers extol the virtues
of Mugabe. 380 The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) dominates the parliament, airwaves, and for-
eign aid inflow. ZANU-PF-sponsored soldiers intimidate opposi-
tion voters into submission. One author described his experience
during the 2000 election: "At least thirty people were killed,
thousands were forced to flee their homes, and the [opposition
party] was prevented from campaigning in large swathes of the
country." 38 ' Thus, the results of Zimbabwean elections are pre-
ordained.
Mugabe's terror campaign has driven the nation to the brink
of starvation and bankruptcy. The Zimbabwean people now face
tremendous hardship, "including chronic food, fuel, and foreign
currency shortages."38 2 They cannot challenge Mugabe through
either ballot or bullet. This sad scenario is yet another manifesta-
tion of prohibiting a people's right to keep and bear arms.
4. Ethiopia Averts Conquest
The historical picture of firearms and tyranny is not entirely
lugubrious. One African nation proves firearms can ensure free-
dom. Excluding a brief five-year stint during World War II, Ethio-
pia bears the distinction of being the only country in Africa never
colonized. This outcome cannot be attributed to geography, unde-
sirability, or mere fortuity. Ethiopia's ability to stave off capitula-
tion to colonial powers can be traced to firearms.
Ethiopia had a significant institutional advantage against co-
lonial intrusion in that it already was an established state when
the Scramble for Africa began in the late nineteenth century.
38 3
Thus, it would be disingenuous to assert firearms alone preserved
Ethiopia. However, it would be equally disingenuous to downplay
the role of weapons in Ethiopia and their importance in repelling
379. Guest, supra n. 375, at 36.
380. Id. at 40-41.
381. Id. at 42.
382. Dzirutwe & Banya, supra n. 378.
383. John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent 171 (Cambridge U. Press 1995).
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colonial powers. Though other factors played a hand in the coun-
try's fate, Ethiopia's ability to defend itself was its saving grace.
"It cannot be gainsaid that fire-arms played a basic role in the
preservation of Ethiopian independence." 38 4
A succession of Ethiopian rulers were driven to secure a sta-
ble flow of weaponry. During the 1860s, Emperor Theodore
sought weapons through trade, diplomacy, and industry. 38 5 After
Theodore's reign, Emperor Yohannes continued his predecessor's
legacy, expanding the nation's supply of guns.38 6 The successor of
Yohannes, Emperor Menelik, completed the arms-obsessed troika.
Menelik "decided that the procurement of modern weaponry was
essential" to the nation's survival. 38 7 Through trading, Menelik
acquired "tens of thousands of magazine-loading rifles, millions of
rounds of ammunition and dozens of modern rifled artillery
gun *388guns."s
These arms proved their worth on multiple occasions. In
1876, Ethiopian forces routed well-armed Egyptian invaders at
Gura. 38 9 In 1896, Ethiopia stopped an Italian advance at the deci-
sive Battle of Adowa, leading to the Treaty of Addis Ababa in
which Italy recognized Ethiopia as an independent state.390 With-
out firearms, Ethiopia would have succumbed to these foreign in-
vaders. Ethiopia's experience is another example of the incom-
plete policy analysis by gun control adherents and collectivists.
Commentators have ignored the important story of Ethiopia and
the defensive use of firearms, painting a skewed picture of the ef-
fects of firearm restrictions. Ethiopia offers another compelling
chapter in the saga of firearms in foreign lands.
D. A Collective Silence on the Consequences of Disarmament
The events set forth above convey the tragic consequences of
defenseless people manipulated by tyrants. A 2004 law review ar-
ticle made a compelling case for the correlation between gun
384. Richard Pankhurst, Guns in Ethiopia, 20 Transition 26, 33 (1965).
385. Id. at 29.
386. Id.
387. Greg Blake, First Italo-Abyssinian War: Battle of Adowa, available at http:ll
www.historynet.com/warsconflicts/19_century/3028431.html?featured=&c=y (accessed
Dec. 27, 2007).
388. Id.
389. Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile 70 (Lynne
Riener 2002).
390. Iliffe, supra n. 383, at 171.
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prohibitions and genocide. 391 This piece delivers a debilitating
blow to those seeking increased firearm restrictions. Unfortu-
nately, a rejoinder to their thesis has not yet been articulated.
Collective right adherents are eerily silent on the role of disarma-
ment in genocides. While ignoring the historical correlation be-
tween disarmament and mass murder, commentators scoff at the
contention that firearms would prevent a national government
with standing armies and massive weaponry. A cursory review of
military history reveals the frequency with which small arms can
challenge a better-equipped force. 392 Firearms and sheer will
have proven a combustible mix for those fighting insurgent forces.
Colonial experiences with insurgencies reveal that no amount of
manpower, material, or money could surmount determined insur-
gencies with a modicum of firepower. Americans should be sensi-
tive to this axiom, as the recent events in Iraq once again estab-
lish that firearms can provide a formidable menace to sophisti-
cated, technological, and heavy artillery.393
The refusal of gun control advocates to address the massacres
facilitated by disarmament and its distant cousin, gun control, is
fascinating. One exception to this silence involves gun control in
Nazi Germany. 394 Some commentators have challenged the hy-
pothesis that gun control paved the way for Hitler's atrocities."
395
Instead, they contend Germany's lack of gun restrictions engen-
dered the capitulation of Nazi foes. One commentator rebuked
this thesis.396 "A regime that would disarm and murder an entire
segment of the population hardly could be said to support... 'the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms.' Indeed, that is the
very kind of regime this right is meant to provide the means to
resist."397 A Holocaust historian confirms this point: "The indis-
391. Kopel et al., supra n. 335, at 113.
392. See John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War,
1961-1974 (Greenwood Press 1997); Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and
the French Defeat in Vietnam (Da Capo Press 2004).
393. See Levinson, supra n. 19, at 657 (discussing the phenomenon of small arms versus
conventional military firepower).
394. See e.g. Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi
Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (A Call to Historians), 73 Fordham L. Rev. 653
(2004); Deborah Homsher, Response to Bernard E. Harcourt's "On Gun Registration," 73
Fordham L. Rev. 715 (2004); Robert J. Spitzer, Don't Know Much about History, Politics, or
Theory, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 721 (2004).
395. Id.
396. Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazism, the Second Amendment, and the NRA: A Reply to
Professor Harcourt, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 113, 116 (2006).
397. Id.
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pensable need, of course, was arms."398 The commentary address-
ing Nazi Germany's gun policies is an insufficient rejoinder be-
cause it ignores the larger picture, the penchant of despotic re-
gimes for using gun control to further their ends.
Some epochs will see tyranny and violence abate. However,
the despotic lust for power underlying the tyrannical governments
of Stalin and Hitler will never vanish. That such a fate could be-
fall the United States is brushed aside, ostensibly because Ameri-
cans are too educated, wealthy, and technologically advanced.
Such a view shows no appreciation for history. This approach is
described as "one aspect of the theory of American exceptional-
ism-the idea that we Americans are different from and perhaps
better than the other members of the human race. '399 Take away
the Bill of Rights and American "exceptionalism" evaporates. It is
folly to think American soil inoculates its inhabitants from revolu-
tion, strife, or tyranny. This misconception is grounded in myopic
romanticism. An advanced society can engage in atrocities as well
as an undeveloped one. What a massacring movement cannot
overcome, at least with not serious costs, is an armed populace.
While the probability of such a catastrophe is infinitesimal, an in-
surance policy against such devastation is a wise course.
Justice Joseph Story called "the right of the citizens to keep
and bear arms" the "palladium of the liberties of the republic," be-
cause it "offers a strong moral check against usurpation and arbi-
trary power of the rulers."400 The bloodletting of the twentieth
century reinforces this axiom. If the Supreme Court is to invoke
international views, it should take notice of the tyranny that has
ensued in foreign countries when a despotic regime controls an
unarmed population. These events are no less relevant to the
Court's international considerations than the fashionable opinions
emanating from the latest world summit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment is not an abstraction. The Founding
Fathers recognized an unarmed populace was a voiceless one. In
their prescience, they understood the right to defend oneself
would transcend time. The Second Amendment is the fountain-
398. Abram L. Sachar, The Redemption of the Unwanted: From the Liberation of the
Death Camps to the Founding of Israel 47-48 (St. Martin's Press 1983).
399. Polsby & Kates, Jr., supra n. 335, at 1261-62.
400. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States vol. 2, 646 (5th
ed., Da Capo Press 1891).
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head from which all other constitutional rights flow. Reading the
Second Amendment out of existence will have dire consequences
for individuals and liberty alike. The plaintiffs in Parker can at-
test to such realities.
The D.C. Circuit's stance in Parker represents a retreat from
the narrow interpretation afforded the Second Amendment.
Judges and commentators who embrace a living Constitution that
mirrors an evolving society on issues such as abortion, homosex-
ual rights, and free speech, suddenly yearn for the colonial milieu
of militias and muskets. The D.C. Circuit's rejection of this out-
dated and inconsistent approach to individual liberty should be
embraced by the Supreme Court, for consistency is the corner-
stone of credibility. Furthermore, a robust reading of the Second
Amendment correlates with the evolving standards of firearm
rights. The States regard individual firearm ownership as the
foremost guarantee of safety and freedom. This coincides with the
reality that the District's ordinance fosters, not foils, violent
crime.
Events of the twentieth century demonstrate the Second
Amendment's relevance. The hellish havoc engendered by dis-
armament stains the pages of history. Defenseless people are left
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of megalomaniacs, foreign invaders,
and fanatical pogroms. Vice President Hubert Humphrey be-
lieved "[t]he right of citizens to bear arms is just one more guaran-
tee against arbitrary government, one more safeguard against the
tyranny which now appears remote in America, but which histori-
cally has proved to be always possible."4 °1
Respecting individual liberty has guided the modern Supreme
Court's constitutional interpretation. Defending oneself is the
epitome of fundamental liberty. As the guardian of constitutional
guarantees, the Supreme Court must do something it has es-
chewed for nearly seventy years: breathe life into the Second
Amendment.
401. David B. Kopel, Guns: Who Should Have Them? 195 (Prometheus Books 1995).
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